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SUMMARY
This research builds further on the existing conceptual framework of the
relationship between decentralization and service delivery and provides a cross-country
empirical examination of the core dimensions of decentralization reform on access to two
key services: health care and improved drinking water sources. The regression results
provide evidence supporting positive and significant effects of fiscal, administrative, and
political decentralization, individually, on the variables used to measure access to health
care, and improved water provision; although the size and robustness of such effects
varies for each dimension of decentralization in relation to each service examined. The
results obtained in this study suggest that there is an additional (or ―extra‖) positive effect
coming from the interaction of two decentralization dimensions on access to health care
and water services (that is, a mutually-reinforcing effect additional to the individual
effect of each dimension of decentralization).

The results obtained also support the

expectation that developing countries could benefit significantly more from
decentralization reforms compared to developed countries. These findings underscore the
importance of considering all dimensions of the decentralization process when
investigating the effects of this reform on any economic, institutional, or social variable.
The policy implications are highly relevant, particularly for developing countries:
decentralization implemented only through one dimension may render fewer positive
fruits in terms of access to services than a multi-dimensional approach. Moreover,
learning more about the most beneficial mutually-reinforcing effects across dimensions
of decentralization may also help strategically in how the overall decentralization reform
is designed.

vii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
A key argument supporting decentralization reform is that it can improve public
service provision by better matching finances with local needs. This study evaluates the
effects of decentralization on access to and intermediate outputs of two essential services
that are typically transferred to sub-national governments1 as a part of the
decentralization process: health and water provision. To do so, this study provides an
analytical framework to examine the relationships between decentralization and service
delivery of health and water, and then provides a cross-country empirical analysis testing
these relationships. To account for decentralization in a comprehensive manner, this
study measures the fiscal, administrative, and political dimensions of decentralization.
Motivation
A critical question in development economics is what kind of reforms developing
and transition countries should undertake to improve basic service delivery and thereby
enhance the standards of living for their people. Decentralization of powers to subnational governments is one of the key reforms with wide implications on this issue.
Despite the fact that most countries have initially pursued decentralization seeking goals
different than economic efficiency and improvement in service delivery, this has been
one of the supporting rationales for decentralization reform provided by many economists
and other experts.

1

In this study, ―sub-national governments‖ refers to all state and local governments below the central (or
federal) government level.

1

Aside from the general motivation arising from the importance of evaluating this
relationship, particularly for developing countries, the following are specific motivating
factors for this study. First, despite a large body of literature on the impact of
decentralization on government size, growth, and macro-economic stability, only a few
studies have evaluated the effects of decentralization on service delivery.
Second, the few existing studies on this issue examine a single service in a single
country. While this approach has the advantage of presenting a more focused and detailed
view, it does not help to examine the effects of more or less decentralized systems on
service delivery, consequently they tend to fall short in evaluating the effect of a
decentralization process as whole on a particular service. Hence, international
comparisons and cross-country empirical evidence, as attempted in this research, on the
effects of decentralization on service delivery, are very important to shed more light on
this issue.
Third, most of the research on this topic evaluates the effects of decentralization
on final outcomes of public services. That is, the dependent variables used include infant
mortality rates, education completion, student performance, and so on. But while having
final outcomes as dependent variables may seem a straightforward way to evaluate
effects of decentralization policy it is also highly treacherous. Indeed, services outcomes,
such as infant mortality for example, may depend heavily on a variety of geographic,
demographic, social, and political factors. Infant mortality rates also depend on other
public services aside from health care itself in a country such as quality of water,
education, social protection programs and safety nets, which in turn makes extremely
complex to argue a direct attribution to any institutional variable or policy change. This
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situation raises the need for approaching the analysis of the relationship between
decentralization and service delivery in a different way. This research examines
intermediate outputs (e.g., coverage of certain services) or ―access‖ as opposed to final
outcomes of services as dependent variables. For example, the World Development
Report (2004) produced by the World Bank argues that availability of doctors to perform
basic services (e.g., pre-natal, birth, and maternal care services), immunization coverage,
and other similar intermediate outputs in health care are essential for improving public
service in this sector. The same report argues that access to improved drinking water
services is essential in developing countries in order to improve service outcomes such as
reduced poor health conditions arising from consumption of contaminated water or for
raising quality of life in general. Thus, the use of intermediate outputs such as access and
availability of certain intermediate outputs (or even inputs as called by the literature in
health and education) in service delivery is a more direct route that this study takes with
the aim of providing relevant insights about how decentralization is performing regarding
the improvement of public services.
Fourth, the empirical literature has analyzed the impact of decentralization on
public services from a single dimension (fiscal, administrative, or political) rather than
from all three simultaneously. Allowing for interaction of all three dimensions of
decentralization in the same analysis can bring more robust evidence on the relationship
between decentralization and access to service delivery and hence bring stronger basis for
providing policy advice in the future.
Fifth, this research is also motivated by the possibility of bringing, as control
variables, other key governance factors that only occasionally are part of the analysis of
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this relationship in the literature. Most of the studies have the typical variables to control
for socio-economic country characteristics in their empirical models (such as income per
capita, growth, demographic aspects, and the like). However, they do not pull into the
discussion governance aspects that may be constraining service delivery. Pritchett (1996)
argues that one unit of budgeted expenditure, whether it is decentralized expenditure or
not, does not necessarily translate into one unit of actual service spending. The latter is
also evidenced by Ablo and Reinikka (1998), who found that on average schools in
Uganda received only 13 percent of the budgetary allocation for non-wage expenditures,
the rest being diluted due corruption or misappropriation to other activity. However,
when we review the literature that evaluates the effects of decentralization on service
delivery, institutional (governance) factors are often absent in the control variables.
In short, this study tackles key aspects often overlooked in the literature on
decentralization, as a way to deepen our understanding of the effects of this reform on
key public services.

4

CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
The literature on decentralization and its effects on socio-economic variables is
too vast to review here. Instead, this Chapter discusses the existing literature on the
relationship of decentralization and service delivery, with a focus on health care and
water provision services. More specifically, this chapter aims to lay down the basis for a
more structured analytical framework to examine this relationship in the subsequent
chapter. It starts by discussing the literature that examines the vehicles through which
decentralization and its three dimensions (fiscal, administrative, and political) can
improve service delivery. Then it discusses the literature with specific arguments and
evidence on the effects of the three dimensions of decentralization on health care and
water provision. Finally, it discusses the literature that argues for the incorporation of
institutional-governance variables in the examination of changes in service delivery due
to institutional/economic reforms (such as decentralization).
Decentralization and its vehicles for improved service delivery: theory and
evidence.
How does decentralization create efficiency gains in service provision?
A premise commonly articulated in the literature on this topic is that many of the
anticipated benefits of decentralization flow from bringing decision makers and decision
making closer to the people and their needs. Classic descriptions of the benefits of
decentralization typically argue along the following lines of reasoning (for example, see
Tiebout 1956 and Musgrave 1959): local decision-makers have access to better
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information on local conditions than central authorities; this knowledge allows them to
better tailor services and public spending patterns to local needs and preferences; this in
turn, with other things hold constant, is expected to improve efficiency and quality of
services for local constituents.
Economists such as Oates (1972) examine heterogeneity in tastes and spillovers
from public goods through models in which local government can adapt outputs to local
tastes, whereas central government produces a common level of public goods for all
localities. Thus, sub-national governments that are closer to the citizens can adjust
budgets to local preferences in a manner that best leads to the delivery of the bundle of
public services that is more fitted and responsive to community preferences. Economists
commonly assume a better match between local government outputs and local
preferences under decentralization, and consequently rate local provision of services as
more efficient, unless this situation is outweighed by spillovers or other efficiencies (for
example, economies of scale) in central government provision (Oates 1972). Tiebout
(1956), argues that decentralization is a vehicle to fulfill highly heterogeneous demand
that may arise from different local governments.
Scholars also examine the efficiency argument supporting decentralization from
the perspective of consumers’ gains due to allocative efficiency and producers’ (e.g.,
government) gains in technical efficiency in delivering goods and services. Allocative
efficiency may arise due to a more fitted bundle (i.e., set and composition) of services
provided by the local government to their citizens; in other words, through the adjustment
that may take place in the proportions of public spending geared to services such as
education, health, water provision or others based on local government’s response to
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local claims in a decentralized context. Faguet (2000) and Arze (2003) provide evidence
to this effect (this is later discussed in more detail for specific services). Higher technical
efficiency is achieved when larger quantities and quality of goods and services are
provided with the same amount of resources (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 2002).
Overall, devolving some of the centralized responsibilities to local levels has been
envisaged in most decentralization agendas as a way to improve both allocative and
technical efficiency across different public services (Wallich 1994, Ebel 2002).
Several economists have argued that the efficiency gains that could be achieved
owing to decentralization could also be outweighed by other efficiency gains arising from
central provision such as economies of scale, ability to attract better personnel, and the
like (De Mello 2004; Tanzi 1996). This indeed is a valid argument, but other scholars
have also argued that those gains arising from central provision may also be
overestimated (Oates 1972; Prud’homme 1995, Sewell and Wallich 1995). Nonetheless,
the theory that allocative and efficiency gains could be achieved have important
implications for improving public service delivery that need to be evaluated, specially in
the context of developing and transition countries.
It is also argued that efficiency gains in service delivery have to be examined
from the accountability perspective (e.g., Prud’homme 1993; Treisman 2002). For
example, Rondinelli (1990) argued that central government ministries rarely have the
incentives to perceive citizens as their clients. In the same line, Dillinger (1994)
suggested that systems where central ministries concentrate large proportions of
expenditure discretion would have more difficulties responding to their national
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constituencies’ demands. He argues that in those systems, people have fewer channels of
communication and expression with the government.
How does decentralization in each of its dimensions (fiscal, administrative and political)
shape the sub-national service provision?
Sufficient fiscal resources and discretion over them are core components of a
decentralized framework of service provision. If local governments are to carry out
expenditure responsibilities and provide public services in a decentralized manner
effectively, they should be able to have an adequate level of revenues to afford those
decentralized functions, either through locally raised revenues, which could bring greater
accountability (McLure 2002), through transferred resources from the central
government, or through other sources (further discussed below). At the same time,
however, local government should be endowed with an adequate level of discretion to
make the decisions about how to use those revenues and thus fulfill the public service
functions2 they expected to deliver (Bird 1986).
The intergovernmental fiscal framework typically has a 4 pillar structure:
expenditure responsibilities, revenue assignments, transfers, and sub-national borrowing.
In other words, within this fiscal framework sub-national governments finance their
expenditure responsibilities (goods and services provided) through the following
channels: first, self-financing using local tax revenues, user charges, or shared revenues
with the central government; second, intergovernmental fiscal transfers, either through
general purpose block transfers or earmarked-specific purpose transfers; and third
through sub-national borrowing. In the context of service delivery at the local level,
2

Local government functions vary from country to country, but they typically include primary and
secondary health care, water and sanitation services, primary and secondary education, and public works on
local infrastructure, among others.
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financing options have also diversified to include public-private partnerships, cofinancing or co-production arrangements through which the users participate in providing
services and infrastructure through monetary or labor contributions, and other coparticipative schemes, all these avenues have also been encouraged by decentralization
processes (Litvack and Seddon 1999).
There are, of course, different levels of discretion in the use of fiscal resources
that central governments establish. They are geared to assure certain level of spending in
specific goods and services provided by sub-national budgets. They depend on a variety
of factors such as local capacity to administer resources, fiscal considerations, national
goals, political issues, and institutional constraints. From the fiscal dimension the central
government typically may be able to control spending allocations through strings
attached in shared revenues and transfers to local governments (i.e., earmarked transfers
or conditional transfers), through sub-national borrowing controls, or through other fiscal
means (Arze and Martinez-Vazquez 2003). The government can also place borrowing
controls or even tighten local borrowing to solely raise resources for certain categories of
goods and services provided at the local level (World Bank 2007). Because of all these
(and other) considerations,

measuring fiscal

decentralization presents

several

complexities and limitations when examining it empirically (Martinez and McNab 2001,
Bird 2000b, Ebel 2002). The issue of measuring the level of fiscal decentralization is
further discussed in the following chapters and it is examined in detail in Appendix A.
Administrative decentralization deals directly with the powers of local officials
who are responsible for delivering services in issues such as personnel, service facilities,
general management, and other administrative discretion in day-to-day operations.
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Rondinelli (1981) offers the most widely used classification of the types of administrative
decentralization: de-concentration, delegation, and devolution.
De-concentration gives sub-national governments some responsibilities within a
sector, but all relevant decisions are made by the ministerial branches. A typical model is
for the central line ministries and agencies to have local representatives that manage
services within the sub-national governments but respond hierarchically to their own
central office. (Rondinelli 1981 and Wallich and Seddon 1999). Under this type of
administrative decentralization, local governments typically can not hire or fire
personnel, do not set salary levels, and can not change the structure of the network of
service facilities in place (i.e., number, size, and type of facilities). Local branches and
representatives in charge of services simply manage day-to-day operations on behalf of
the central ministry and under its watchful eye.
Delegation involves the transfer of implementation functions to sub-national
entities that deliver services. Through delegation, the central government transfers
responsibility for implementation and administration to local governments, including
service facilities not completely controlled by central ministries, but ultimately
accountable to it (Rondinelli 1981). The ―delegation‖ scheme is a blend between deconcentration and devolution (explained below), thus, the levels of decision-making
power vary significantly within that range across countries. In some countries delegation
implies some personnel responsibilities passed down, but in others this may not be case
(this is discussed in more detail for heath care and water services later in this chapter).
Overall, the more routine operations are local discretion but more strategic and some
personnel decisions remain at the central level.
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Finally, devolution is a more complete transfer of administrative decision-making
power to sub-national authorities. It empowers them with legal decision-making power
and the ability to generate and control resources, including the sub-national public sector
employees hiring and firing, career management and pay. Moreover, typically it provides
local government with the ability to reallocate resources (including staff) across service
facilities within their jurisdiction adapting to local circumstances (World Bank 2007).
Often, nevertheless, some central guidelines need to be followed, mainly with the aim of
pursuing national objectives in certain areas.
Political decentralization gives citizens through their elected leaders more power
in public decision-making. It is often associated with a pluralistic setting and a
representative government (Stuti Kemani 2001). The premise is that service delivery
policies taken at the sub-national level will be better informed and more relevant to
diverse interests in society than those taken only by national political authorities. More
importantly, political decentralization may help to strengthen accountability, which is
necessary for improved service delivery (WDR 2004). If local elected officials make
policy decisions about services that affect citizens, they in turn can hold the local officials
accountable and remove them from power in the next local elections.
What does the literature present in terms of evidence in the relationship between
decentralization and service provision?
As for the argument of allocative efficiency, an empirical study developed in local
governments in Colombia (World Bank 1995) presented interesting insights. Using
survey data and government expenditure data from 16 municipalities, this study analyzed
the match between government provision of services (central and local) vis a vis local
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preferences. In the study, most respondents to the survey indicated that they trusted local
governments’ elected officials more than the national government’s to deliver goods and
services. The findings suggested that the allocation of resources made by local
governments was more consistent with community preferences than allocations from the
center.
Faguet (2000) performed an in-depth study of fiscal decentralization in Bolivia
with the objective of evaluating the influence of this process on changes in expenditure
patterns at the local level. His results showed that following Bolivia’s fiscal
decentralization reform spending patterns changed (through sharp increases in relative
funding levels) in favor of education, water and sanitation, water management,
agriculture and urban development. Moreover, Faguet’s study found that these changes
are strongly positively related to real local needs, supporting the argument of allocative
efficiency. That is, he found that increased investment in education, water and sanitation,
water management, were steeper where illiteracy rates were higher and water and
sewerage connection rates lower.
Arze (2003) also finds a change in expenditure composition following higher
fiscal decentralization. More specifically, this study finds a sharper increase in health and
education spending as a percentage of total spending with more decentralization, with
stronger results for developing countries. Developing countries in average spent a smaller
share of their budgets in these sectors and have poorer education and health outputs and
outcomes. Thus, one could infer that improvements in allocative efficiency may be taking
place as result of further fiscal decentralization.
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At the same time, many claim that higher public spending in a specific sector,
even if this is what the population demands, does not necessarily lead to better final
outcomes (Inchauste 2000; Pritchett 1996; Ablo and Reinikka, 1998). For instance, both
in Cote d’ Ivoire and Haiti per capita health spending fell to below five dollars from the
1980’s through the 1990’s but with a different result in each of these countries: infant
mortality rates worsened severely in the African country and improved in Haiti (WDR
2004). Another example is the big difference in per capita public spending in health
between Mexico and Jordan, but with both countries having similar reductions in
mortality rates. 3
Kaufmann et al. (2002) evaluate decentralization effects on access to public
services. Using a survey of local agencies, this study found that both local and central
service providers in Bolivia were falling short in delivering an adequate quantity and
quality of services, but local agencies were more successful in being accessible to
citizens4, particularly for the poorer brackets of population segments. As decentralization
is still an unfolding process (in this country and others), the positive results in access of
services to poor people might be an preliminary indication of future improvement in final
outcomes such as infant mortality rates, as poor people are the most vulnerable.
The cross-country and country-specific evidence discussed earlier points toward
the existence of specific attributes and effects of decentralized service provision in terms
of

responsiveness and improvement in access to service delivery. However, this is just

a first step in identifying the effects of decentralization on public services. The rest of this

3

World Bank’s World Development Report (2004).

4

Respondents claimed lower waiting times and lower payments for service in local service providers.
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section is devoted to discussing the arguments and evidence provided in the literature
regarding decentralization and its impact on two specific services, health care and water
provision.
Decentralization and its effects on the health sector: arguments and evidence.
The general argument for decentralizing health care is that greater local
participation in health policy and local accountability can lead to improved quantity
(including coverage) and quality of service. Yet, exactly how these benefits can be
realized and the impact of different kinds of reforms is not well understood (Litvack and
Seddon 1999). The highly differentiated levels of health provision (i.e., primary,
secondary, and tertiary) and several additional aspects of health care, such as family
planning, information campaigns, and the training and supervision of personnel, make the
effects of decentralization on this service more difficult to understand, particularly when
looking at final outcomes.
Moreover, DeMello (2004) stated that decentralization in the health sector tends
to be more complex than in other sectors because diseconomies of scale. He argues that
these diseconomies of scale tend to discourage sub-national governments in the provision
of costly curative treatments and immunization. At the same time, he argues, spillover
effects tend to discourage the sub-national provision of preventive health care,
particularly immunization and epidemiological controls.
Nevertheless, decentralization of the health sector has become appealing to many
researchers, international donors, and policy makers because it raises expectations about
several advantages including the following (Mills 1994, p.24):
• A less unified health service that is better tailored to local preferences.
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• Improved success in the implementation health programs. That is, day-to-day
overlooking and evaluation, which are necessary for implementation, are more
likely to succeed under local accountability
• Reduced inequalities between urban and rural areas and between accessible
and secluded regions of the country. This is assumed to occur due to proximity
and responsiveness of rural local governments and providers to the needs of rural
people—typically, in poorer countries rural areas tend to be more underserved
than urban areas.
• Lower costs due to better targeted programs. This argument assumes that local
service providers would tend to have better information about the local population
to better allocate resources to target the poorer income groups.
• Greater community involvement and higher chance of sustainability in the longrun.
Little concrete evidence confirms these potential benefits, however. Few developing
countries have long-term experience with health sector decentralization, and its impact on
the management of the sector and on the services it delivers has rarely been evaluated
(DeMello 2004).
Fiscal decentralization in the health sector
Many developing countries have decentralized the public health care system in
the last twenty years, but little empirical research has been conducted on the effects of
these fiscal changes in the health sector (Guilkey and Racelis, 2002). Robalino, Picazo
and Voetberg (2001) developed one of the few existing cross-country evaluations of this
relationship. This study focuses on the impact of fiscal decentralization on infant
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mortality rates, which is a typical final outcome used in the literature to measure policies’
impact on health care. Using panel data that includes developing and developed countries
from 1970 to 1995, this study finds that countries where local governments manage a
higher share of public expenditures tend to have lower mortality rates. Additionally, the
authors argue that in their sample of countries, the share of public expenditures managed
by local governments was correlated with their level of administrative capacity.
Robalino, Picazo and Voetberg (2001) suggest only when local governments have
stronger administrative capacity is fiscal decentralization likely to improve health
outcomes. This implies the need for evaluating fiscal and administrative decentralization
jointly (i.e., in the same model in empirical models).
Cross-country evaluation like the one discussed above has been to a great extent
neglected in the evaluation of fiscal decentralization and health outcomes. Rather,
specific country case studies (some with empirical analysis) have been used to shed light
on that relationship. Schwartz, Guilkey, and Racelis (2002) analyzed audited line-item
annual expenditure reports for about 1600 local governments the Philippines before and
after the decentralization process started in 1994.5 The study also combines these data
with secondary census and demographic data in order to examine changes in the level and
composition of local government health expenditures and the impact of these
expenditures on the consumption of public health goods and services before and after
decentralization.

The results suggest that per capita expenditures in health increased

5

The same study has been applied to other countries like Tanzania, Paraguay and Uganda with similar
results. These studies were performed under the MEASURE evaluation project (sponsored by USAID)
conducted by the North Carolina Population Center between 2000 and 2003 (University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill).
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immediately following devolution and continued to increase in 1995 and 1998 compared
with per capita expenditure levels of prior years. They state that per capita increases
appear to be more pronounced for provincial expenditures than for municipal
expenditures, probably because more costly responsibilities in hospitals were devolved to
provincial governments. The results also suggest that local governments, which had
discretionary authority over unconditional transfers, allocated increasing shares of total
resources to health at the expense of other locally provided government services
following the decentralization process. This latter finding is line with that of Arze (2003),
who argues that increased shares of spending in health and education follow higher levels
of fiscal decentralization across countries.
Nevertheless, even in fiscal matters, local accountability is apparently a key
element. A study developed by Khemani (2004) on 30 local governments in Nigeria
presented evidence that the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations has an important
effect on local accountability and ultimately on health services 6. This study found a
widespread situation of non-payment of public health facilities’ personnel, which led to
lower quality of service (e.g., higher doctor absenteeism, lower drug availability).
Moreover, Khemani (2004) argued that this situation can not be explained solely by lack
of financial resources available for health services to local governments but rather by lack
of local accountability on those resources. This study suggests that conditional transfers
which are the main source of local health spending may be damaging local accountability
because the public does not hold local officials accountable for those resources.
Administrative decentralization in the health sector
6

This study is based on a survey undertaken by Das Gupta, Gauri and Khemani (2004) in the Nigerian
States of Kogi and Lagos, covering 30 local governments, 252 public primary care health facilities and over
700 health providers.
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In the health sector in developing countries, the most common type of
decentralization is a combination of de-concentration and delegation (Silverman, 1992;
Bronfman, 1998). Analyzing the shift of administrative power from the center to the subnational levels can be a difficult task. A great variety of elements need to be taken into
account: for example, there are a great variety of projects and functions in which subnational governments participate in coordination with line ministries that make that task
complex. Bossert (1998) characterizes the range of powers and responsibilities as the
―decision space‖ given to local governments on issues such as service organization,
hospital autonomy, civil service, access rules, and governance rules. Probably the ones
that make the biggest difference about how sub-national governments provide a service
are the discretion on personnel and decision making power on facilities’structure (Cohen
2002).
In Colombia, Bossert et al. (2000) examined the effects of increased ―decision
space‖, finding that administrative decentralization increased utilization of health services
and health expenditures per capita. For the cases of Ghana, Zambia, Uganda and the
Philippines, Bossert and Beauvais (2002) found that the supposedly decentralized health
systems allowed only moderate choices over expenditures, fees, contracting, and
targeting. In all these countries, local governments were given some administrative
authority, but central imposition of salaries seemed to be detrimental to the decisionmaking process.
Decentralization in health services has reached, in some countries, the hospital
level. Although there is not yet hard evidence about the effects of greater hospital
autonomy on hospital outputs and performance, case studies and survey-based evaluation
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have shed some light on this policy (Sengooba et al. 2002). For the case of Argentina,
Gonzales Prieto (2003) examines changes in hospital performance and local
accountability as a result of decentralization and autonomy granted to hospitals. His
results show that greater hospital autonomy has brought about more accountability in
health care responsibilities. However, this study did not find a strong positive effect of
decentralization and hospital autonomy on hospital performance. 7 In order to evaluate
the effects of greater autonomy on hospital performance and quality of service provided,
Sengooba et al. (2002) examined the differences between public hospitals and Private
Non-For Profit (PNFP) hospitals in 3 districts in Uganda8. This study found that public
hospitals consistently had worse performance and drug availability compared to PNFP
hospitals.
In the case of the Philippines, Jack (2002) argues if increased administrative
responsibility is not accompanied by adequate funding, decentralization may even
deteriorate service delivery quality. From these results it can be implied that
administrative decentralization (or any other dimension of decentralization) by itself may
not be sufficient to generate the expected benefits. Furthermore, this observation supports
the argument that each dimension of fiscal decentralization can not be analyzed
independently of the others. Along similar lines of reasoning, using data from Brazilian
municipalities, Mobarak et al (2006) find that administrative decentralization only
provides good results when it is accompanied by good governance.
7

Although a positive and significant relationship was not found for the whole sample of 90 hospitals
evaluated, when the author grouped the hospitals according to the level of autonomy, the group of hospitals
with higher autonomy reported considerable higher performance indicators compared to the rest.
8

Hospital performance is evaluated through different indicators such as patient workload per doctor and
cost and expenditures per patient. To account for quality of the service delivery of hospital they use factors
such as drug stocks, availability of equipment and doctors, and patients satisfaction with the quality of
health care received.
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Political decentralization in the health sector
It is commonly argued that political decentralization brings accountability to the
system and may improve health service delivery (World Development Report 2004). This
may occur because citizens have a channel to provide input on local decision-making
processes and hold local decision-makers accountable for their actions (Khemani 2006).
McGreevey (2000) argues that political decentralization, in the context of a decentralized
provision of health services, is essential to ensure accountability and improvements in
efficiency. He argues that the realization of the benefits of decentralization requires not
only devolving financial resources and administrative functions to lower tiers of
government but also instituting electoral accountability.
Thus, in improving local accountability in service delivery through the political
process, local elections may be a powerful tool for citizens. Betancourt and Gleason
(1999), for example, found that in India an increased allocation of nurses to rural districts
is associated with higher turnout in local elections. Khemani (2001) found that voters in
local elections reward incumbents for local income growth, and punish them for the lack
of it and for increased local inequality in their tenure. More interestingly, this research
finds that this voting behavior at the local level is more consistent over time than the
voting behavior in national elections. These studies highlight the importance of local
accountability mechanisms, including political decentralization, in improving service
delivery.
Another rationale is that political decentralization allows for a more widespread
political representation (Neven 2003), that is, bringing more diverse and often
underrepresented groups to participate in decision making about health services. There is
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evidence that this has happened in countries such as Pakistan and India, where people of
traditionally excluded and vulnerable groups, such as women, farmers in rural areas and
indigenous people, now have a role in the political process (World Bank 2005;
Raghabendra and Dulfo 2003). In these two countries women and other groups have
reserved seats in the legislative bodies of local governments, as a consequence of the
political decentralization process. Furthermore, the participation of these groups has
already created an impact on how much local governments spend in services such as
health. In India, for example, Raghabendra and Dulfo (2003) found that higher
participation of women in local governments, through the reserved seats, is associated
with a shift in public spending on health care and water provision. While the findings of
Raghabendra and Dulfo (2003) highlight the impact of a complex process of local
political representation, they nevertheless help to support the argument that widespread
political representation would not be possible without political decentralization as a first
step.
One of the few existing empirical studies on the effects of political
decentralization and health across countries, Khaleghian (2003), evaluates the impact of
political decentralization on immunization rates using a panel time-series data set of 140
low- and middle-income countries from 1980 to 1997. He finds that in the low-income
group, increased decentralization is associated with higher coverage.
Decentralization and its effects on the water provision sector: arguments and
evidence.
Water is increasingly being managed as an economic rather than a social good,
and decentralization in its various forms may be a useful tool to support this new
approach (Braadbaart and Schwartz 2000). Governments and other reformers are now
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trying to link service levels and costs, provide incentives to increase the efficiency of
water resource allocation, reduce costs, and increase sustainability of water service
systems (Lorrain 1992). In theory, decentralized water services should improve
governments’ ability to treat water as an economic good. Moreover, as argued throughout
this section, a locally accountable provision scheme would help impose user charges that
could create incentives for efficient water use as well as for a self financed water
provision.
Fiscal decentralization and water provision
The argument often made that lower-level governments, closer to the
beneficiaries, have an advantage in identifying citizens’ preferences as well as the
flexibility to respond to local conditions seems also to be common in the literature on
water provision (Mclean 2001). As local governments use this information to improve
access, reliability, and higher quality of water, consumers may be willing to pay more for
services (Ahmad 2002). These increased user charges can, in turn, be used to finance
expansion, improvement, and maintenance of the existing network (Lorrain 1992).
Indeed, as Bahl and Linn (1992) argued, the provision of services by municipal
governments or other local bodies can be enhanced by the use of revenues raised as user
fees to finance maintenance and even capital expenditures.
There is not cross country empirical evidence about the effects of decentralization
on water provision and the country case studies bring mostly descriptive and anecdotal
experiences. One probable reason for this situation is the lack of data in the field, which
in turn is caused by difficulties in measuring the availability, access, and quality of this
service. Descriptive evidence from new decentralized approaches points towards the
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theory that users are willing to pay for water services if they are tailored to and fulfill
their needs. A 1993 World Bank study found this to be true across different income
levels. This study showed that low income households in marginal urban areas are willing
to pay higher tariffs, if they would obtain an improved access to the service in return.
This may be explained by the fact that lower income groups without household
connection to water are currently paying higher prices for water than higher income
groups in the same countries (with household water connection) (World Development
Report 2004).
Although large capital investments are usually financed by central or ministerial
branches, user charges are increasingly common for operations and maintenance of
feeder systems (Ahmad 2002). The WDR (2004) argues that fiscal decentralization may
allow local governments to charge for water services, which in turn can enhance the local
policy makers’ accountability to citizens. On the opposite case, without access to enough
revenues from the clients, the service provider depends on the policymakers for fiscal
resources to maintain service provision and in this way the local accountability may be
harmed (WDR 2004). In many countries where water provision services depend on
transfers from the central government there is lack of predictability on the amount and
timeliness of the funding. This situation leaves the provider short in financial resources,
which may lead to a vicious cycle of lower quantity and quality of services and even
lower local revenues (Ahmad 2002). But the opposite is also argued: Zamman (2002),
based on a case study of Indonesia, states that own-funded providers, especially if they
have private management, do not commonly have good results and face opposition from
local consumers and unions.
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Administrative decentralization and water provision
Following the classification of the types of administrative decentralization made
by Rondinelli (1981) explained earlier, we can disaggregate water provision into deconcentrated, delegated and devolved schemes. According to Evans (2003), the deconcentrated system of water provision is the most common in the least developed
countries. A common approach is to locate staff from the corresponding ministerial
branch in units at intermediate and local governments to be responsible for water services
delivery. The units develop their operation based mainly on technical considerations such
as viability of the water source rather than identifying specific the needs of the population
served. Not surprisingly, this approach created few incentives for users to financially
assist government in maintaining or financing water services (Ahmad 1996).
Under the delegation model, governments transfer water management to public
or even semi-private (public private partnerships) water agencies or management
companies. These agencies are responsible for providing services within a specified
region and are accountable to central ministerial branches. In the devolution approach,
urban and rural units of water supply are fully placed under local tutelage. According to
the Ahmad (1996), the degree of responsibilities may vary according to the local
government administrative capacity. When local governments are more skilled, they can
undertake activities that range from very technical in nature to activities related to
community involvement. Local governments that lack technical capacity can still interact
with the communities while relying on staff from higher tiers of government for technical
support. Most of the literature on this point out that whatever approach is taken would
work differently (more or less successfully) depending on country characteristics and
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institutional settings. Rosenweig and Perez (1999) argue that each country is sufficiently
different so that the solutions and option for water provision will not be the same.
Again, cross country empirical evidence is very scarce on this topic. Bardhan
(2002) found some evidence about the relationship of administrative decentralization and
water services. He analyzes 121 completed rural water supply projects, financed by
various international donor agencies in several countries. His results showed that
projects with high participation of local communities in project selection and design were
much more likely to have the water supply maintained in good condition. In other words,
projects with more decentralized decision making were more likely to be sustainable than
projects with centralized decision-making.
More abundant is the single-country based literature that looks at this
relationship. In Uganda, water provision projects with bottom-up planning and
empowerment of communities were implemented improving local ownership and
enhancing sustainability (USAID 2001). In Mexico, after the government transferred the
management of irrigation systems to users’ associations, recovery of costs increased from
30 percent to about 80 percent (Water and Sanitation Program- World Bank 2003). In
Egypt, cropping intensity almost doubled after farmer-managed irrigation systems were
introduced (Water and Sanitation Program- World Bank 2003). There is more anecdotal
evidence of success from Ghana, Benin, Ecuador, Bolivia, India, and South Africa,
particularly in extending the access of the service to relatively secluded rural areas
(Castillo 1998).

25

Political decentralization and water provision
Koppel (1987) argued that user participation and political accountability through
this participation is essential for the performance and sustainability of water programs.
As in the case of fiscal and administrative decentralization of water provision the existing
evidence is mainly descriptive and anecdotal. Based on a case study of Indonesia,
Zamaan (2002) argues that water provision can be cheaper and more efficient if water
providers are managed with the active engagement of local stakeholders (i.e., water
provision cooperatives, consumers, and elected representatives). Moreover, he argues that
under this type of scheme, providers are held accountable to consumers and elected
representatives. He concludes that better service provision would have a better chance to
occur where representatives are democratically elected and structures are in place for
citizen-initiated accountability.
An interesting example of citizen engagement in service delivery in
democratically elected local governments is the case of the city of Porto Alegre, Brazil.
In this city, citizens and neighborhood associations of different regions participate in the
city’s assembly meetings to discuss with locally elected politicians the local budget
allocation for each different service, specific needs of the different districts, and even
implementation issues. These joint politician-citizen discussions have generated
impressive results. Between 1989 and 1996 access to basic sanitation (water and sewage)
nearly doubled, while increasing revenue collection by 48 per cent (Santos 1998). This
also highlights the willingness of citizens to pay for services if the services they need are
in fact delivered.
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Other factors to consider when looking at the relationship between decentralization
and service delivery
Governance aspects such as corruption and citizen participation in decisionmaking have been evaluated as the cause of a variety of socio economic outcomes
including significant variance in service delivery outcomes. However, these variables
seem to be ignored in most of the literature that evaluates the impact of decentralization
on service delivery. Only a few studies like Khaleghian (2003), which has a variable for
political rights in the local governments, consider this type of constraining factors9.
Corruption
Administrative corruption can be profoundly damaging to the quantity and
quality of service delivery across these key sectors. Corruption is often deeply rooted in
public administration and leads providers of services to have unethical behaviors. The
health sector, for instance, is characterized by a deep interdependence of providers and
clients (Pritchet 1996). In this relationship there are factors like asymmetric information,
divergence between public and private interests and incentives, and other characteristics
that provide fertile ground for corruption (Lewis 1999). Patients, especially the poor, are
in a distinctively weak position to counter these difficulties (WDR 2004).
Kaufman et al. (1999) argue that governance factors such as corruption and infant
mortality rates have a strong negative correlation. Gupta, Verhoeven, and Tiongson
(1999) also find that countries with higher levels of corruption tend to have higher child
and infant mortality rates than countries with lower indexes of corruption. Rajkumar and
Swaroop (2002) evaluate the links between public spending, governance, and service

9

See also Rajkumar and Swaroop (2002), which considers corruption in evaluating sector expenditures and
education outcomes.
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outcomes. Using data from a cross-section of countries for two periods of time, they
found that increasing public spending on primary education is likely to be more effective
in increasing primary education attainment but only in an environment where governance
(e.g., control of corruption) also improves. One of the main variables to measure good
governance was the level of corruption. This study clearly frames the questions of public
spending and its effect on education attainment on governance issues. Based on survey
data of health care users and health facilities across 105 urban and rural municipalities in
Bolivia, Gatti, Gray-Molina and Klugman (2002) examined the determinants of
corruption and citizen participation in health services. They found that corruption was
significantly associated with longer waiting time to obtain medical care.
Another important issue to consider in corruption is the likelihood of capture by
interest groups, particularly in poor countries (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000a). That is,
while local governments may have better local information and generate better
accountability, they may be more vulnerable to capture by local elites, who will then
receive a disproportionate share of sub-national spending on public goods adjusted to
their preferences (Bardhan 2001). Evidence from country experiences signals that this is
likely to happen in sub-national governments where civic participation is low (Shah
2002).
Voice and Citizen Participation for Greater Accountability
As Gatti, Gray-Molina, Klugman (2003) argue, citizen participation in the public
policy debate is envisaged as a mechanism to bring more accountability and transparency
to the decision making, particularly at the local level. Aside from voting out politicians
(in the context of political decentralization) citizens can address their disapproval of
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public services by protesting (e.g., through the media or citizens’ organizations), through
involvement in political affairs, or by finding alternative sources of supply. Thus, citizen
and civil society organizations involvement in decisions about how public money is
budgeted and spent at the sub-national level has been proposed as a very important tool
for accountability. 10 The channels for this participation include the traditional civic
involvement in political affairs (i.e., electoral participation), freedom of speech, political
rights, the formation of civic groups, and the use of the media (Kaufmann et al. 2003).
There is growing country-case based evidence about the effects of citizen
participation resulting in improvements in service delivery within the context of
decentralization. In Mexico, over 22,000 health committees were created by 1998 to
oversee health provision and participate in health campaigns and training with positive
initial results (World Bank 1999). Evidence from Colombia and Bolivia show that
citizens/constituents oversight can be a force in pushing local governments to improve
their capacity and responsiveness (Faguet 2000; 2005). Thus, regular and clean elections,
and citizen participation can increase the pressure on local leaders to turn citizens’
demands into outputs. Indeed, civic engagement can importantly influence how
governments allocate resources, especially if local government budget information is
available and disseminated to citizens (Keefer and Khemani 2004).
The city of Porto Alegre, Brazil, for example, is a widely cited example of how
civic involvement in budgeting can enhance resource allocation as well as contribute to
democratic governance. In this city, budgets are of public domain and informal
preparatory meetings are held to discuss demands of various community associations
(unions, cooperatives, mothers’ clubs, etc.) for investment across service sectors and total
10

Hirsman (1970); Gray-Molina et al (1999); Kaufmann (2002)
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budget availability (Santos 1998; World Bank 2001). These demands are then ranked and
aggregated for budget allocation by needs and population size. Since 1989, the workers
party has won three consecutive municipal elections in Porto Alegre. Between 1989 and
1996, the percentage of households with access to water services and municipal sewage
system rose from 80 percent to 98 percent and from 46 to 85 percent, respectively.
During the same period, the number of children enrolled in public schools doubled and
city revenues increased by nearly 50 percent. 11 In this case, the level of participation
extends beyond information sharing and consultation. Citizens and civil society
organizations propose spending projects, set priorities, and help decide which projects
should be funded. There appears to be a direct link between increased civic participation
in municipal budgeting and service delivery outcomes, including increases in
infrastructure investment and education expenditures in poor areas (WDR 2004). Citizen
participation guarantees legitimacy to decisions, and objective budgeting ensures a higher
degree of fairness in an otherwise arbitrary process that it always subject to local elite
capture.
There is also some empirical evidence about the influence of citizen and
community participation in improving accountability and service delivery. In a study of
Bolivia’s citizen participation under a newly decentralized system of health care service
provision, Gray-Molina et al. (1999) found that informal payments and longer wait times
for service in municipal health providers, were less prevalent in cities and towns where
local citizens participated in health boards. A follow up study on the former developed by
Gatti, Gray-Molina and Klugman (2003) found that wait times for medical treatment and

11

This information has been drawn from World Bank (2001).
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informal payments in the health sector were reduced were OTBs, the grass root
organizations created by the decentralization law, were more active.12 This later study
also found that exit options (i.e., private health care facilities) do not help to reduce the
situation of informal payments and waiting times for medical treatment. Also in Bolivia,
Kaufmann et al. (2002) based on a survey of central and local government agencies found
that citizen’s voice and participation variables were statistically significant in improving
public sector performance13. Moreover, they found that citizen voice was more important
for government performance in delivering services than public management tools such as
higher salaries or rule enforcement. This may be evidence to support Dillinger’s (1995)
statement about urban service delivery; he argued that public service delivery
performance seemed an issue that hardly could be addressed only through the
organizational context. Rather, this issue should be addressed by observing and taking
into account other factors that affect the relationships between governments and their
constituencies.
Conclusion
This chapter discussed in a focused manner the literature that articulates the
linkages between decentralization policy and public service delivery, particularly for
services such health care and water provision. Moreover, it highlighted the studies that
provide some evidence of the impact of decentralization (through each of its dimensions,
namely fiscal, administrative, and political) on different aspects of public service
12

OTBs or Organizaciones Territoriales de Base were created by the Decentralization Law of Bolivia (Ley
de Participación Popular) as the grass roots committees in charge of communicating the voice and the
desires of the communities to their local governments regarding how the budget should be spent. Gatti et al.
(2003) found no significant correlation between voter turnout or the number of OTB and informal
payments and wait times. However, there was an effect when OTB were active in their local governments.
13
Citizen’s voice was measured through variables such as the existence of clearly defined mechanisms to
ask users about their needs and preferences; and the existence of mechanisms to address users’ complaints,
among others.
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delivery, including quantity and quality of services. However, this focused review also
showed that only fewer studies provide cross-country examination of the effects of this
policy on public services, which enables the evaluation of the effect of different levels
decentralization. Moreover, the discussion in this chapter captured the rather fragmented
treatment of the decentralization process in the literature, that is, the evaluation of the
effects of decentralization (on socio economic variables) looking at a single dimension of
this policy. The next chapter articulates the case for looking at decentralization in a more
comprehensive way and discusses the basis of a framework to examine this policy and its
effects on service delivery.
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CHAPTER 3
AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN DECENTRALIZATION AND SERVICE DELIVERY
This chapter provides a framework of the relationship between decentralization
and service delivery by discussing selected aspects of this relationship, and by examining
the process and implications of providing services at the local level. This chapter also
serves as a preamble to the empirical analysis undertaken in Chapter 4, by informing the
construction of empirical models that involve the analysis of decentralization reforms.
This chapter is organized as follows: first it discusses the causes of
decentralization as a way to examine issues such as exogeneity in the models that contain
this reform as an explanatory variable; then it discusses the relevance of the three core
dimensions of the decentralization process (i.e., fiscal, administrative and political) in
evaluating the depth of this reform; and finally it discusses a simple framework to
examine service delivery in the local context.
Why are decentralization reforms initiated?
Decentralization processes are often initiated for and driven by political factors
rather than with the objective of improving economic efficiency. These political factors
are commonly related to a country’s population and institutional characteristics and
legacies. This argument has been discussed extensively and is widely acknowledged, and
while it is not the central issue of this research, it is important to briefly discuss it because
understanding why decentralization processes were initiated helps to grasp the context in

33

which this policy interacts with (and affects) other economic, social, and institutional
variables.
Moreover, understanding why decentralization reform is initiated is also essential
for constructing econometric models to evaluate empirically the effects of this reform.
For example, considerations about causality in the relationships examined can be first
approached by understanding properly the origins and triggers of the evaluated reforms in
the right hand side of the regression.
The literature of fiscal federalism of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s already
recognized that decentralization processes were prompted by political considerations and
historical legacies (Oates 1972). In many federations (e.g., United States, India, and
Germany) colonies and strong self- acknowledged jurisdictions existed before the
countries themselves existed. Thus, maintaining or re-initiating decentralization processes
was a way to hold together nations within a larger nation. Similarly, even in some unitary
countries in Western Europe, historical legacies fostered a system with decentralized
authorities: Spain, for example, is an agglutination of kingdoms and territories, and the
historical legacies embedded in this situation are central for understanding the demands
for decentralization in this country (Lopez-Laborda, Martinez-Vazquez, and Monasterio
2006).
Powerful triggers for decentralization are regional, cultural, ethnic, and religious
tensions often seen within developing countries but also in transition and developed
countries (Fox and Wallich 1997; Van Houten et al 1993; Leon 2001). Bird (2003), for
example states the following: “Canada, Russia, Nigeria, Indonesia, Macedonia,
Switzerland, South Africa, China, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Spain, Uganda, the
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Philippines, Tanzania, India, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, the United Kingdom, Ethiopia, Turkey,
Serbia, Algeria, Sudan, Moldova, Morocco, Cameroon, even France…What can such a
diverse set of countries (and many others) have in common? The answer is that each
contains within its boundaries a significant territorially-based group of people who are (or
consider themselves to be) distinct and different – in ethnicity, in language, in religion, or
just in history….” (pp. 1).
In many countries of Africa, South Asia, and East Asia and the Pacific, those
regional conflicts along ethnic, linguistic, or religion lines frequently induce powerful
demands for greater autonomy. In the most extreme cases, where conflicts and
grievances are so strong that they threaten peace and the existence of the country as such,
relinquishing some powers from the center to the regions is seen as one of the few
solutions for stability and peace. In those extreme cases, Posen (2003) argues that people
feel that only a decentralized (or federal) structure may insulate ethnic groups from
predatory (ethnic) politics. Overall, under lower and higher level of regional tensions, the
decentralization process itself is seen by leaders, politicians, and external stakeholders as
a tool for stabilizing and attempting to resolve those political demands and grievances.
In the Latin American context, while some argued that structural reforms of the
1980’s and early 1990’s reduced the role of central government and consequently
prompted decentralization (Ames 1999), the reality is that in most countries
decentralization reforms ran almost parallel to (and in some cases ahead of) core
structural reforms. The same is true for many transition economies in Eastern Europe and
Central Asia. A number of scholars have also suggested that decentralization presented
an avenue to pass-down fiscal deficits, and this is indeed factually true, but that was not
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the prime reason for starting the reform process (Bird and Vaillancourt 1998; see also
Wallich 1994). Rather, and as Montero and Samuels (2004) find after exhaustive country
case studies in Latin American countries, political choices played a major role in
prompting decentralization. Case by case, the research of these authors show that it is
either an ―electoralist‖ goal (where political parties initiate decentralization to
reinvigorate or improve their political bases) or regional pressures and tensions
(originated by historical legacies) and in some cases both, that induce the initiation (or reinitiation) of a decentralization reform. These authors conclude that there is little
evidence that promoting efficiency was the objective behind decentralization reforms in
Latin America.
In post-socialist countries, democratization and devolution of some fiscal,
administrative, and political power seems the most plausible reason for initiating
decentralization during the transition period. The collapse of the socialist regimes in
Central and Eastern Europe, for example, came with strong hopes of redistributing power
that was so highly concentrated previously. Illner (1999), in a study examining the
transfer of power of local government across Central and Eastern Europe argues that
government decentralized some functions and resources after the transition in order to
support their legitimacy in the midst of the political instability. He also argues that
decentralization served as an emblem of the widely hoped democratization.
With focus on the relationship between decentralization and service delivery
Treisman (2002) argues that: ―It is hard to see how the rate of infant inoculations, the
availability of improved water sources, sanitation facilities, or essential drugs, or the
youth illiteracy rate could themselves affect decentralization, except perhaps via their
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effect on national income.‖ But a counterpoint could be inferred, to some extent, from
Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2005) when responding to the question of ―why
decentralization‖ they argue that ―decentralization is usually introduced as a policy to
offset a problem that has caused dissatisfaction with the present system of governance.‖
These authors note that further pressures for decentralization may be increased when
citizens are dissatisfied by the performance of the government, and one could infer that
performance of government also includes the performance of public services it delivers.
The Relevance of the Three Dimensions of Decentralization
As discussed earlier, the decentralization process has three main dimensions:
fiscal, administrative, and political. Due to limited data availability, the empirical
literature has mainly focused on the first dimension and has used that aspect as proxy for
the overall process. Moreover, many studies focusing on fiscal decentralization seem to
overlook the fact that the political and administrative aspects of the process are
intrinsically related to the fiscal one, and do not even comment about these inter-linkages
while drawing conclusions from their empirical analyses. This omission in empirical
examinations might be leading to biased results. See also Appendix A for a detailed
discussion on assessing properly fiscal decentralization, and the difficulties of measuring
properly this multi-faced dimension of the decentralization in the context of a multidimensional reform.
Accounting for all three dimensions of decentralization in an empirical model is
critical for the several reasons. First, each individual dimension of decentralization is
likely to have an individual effect on the dependent variable, and thus omitting one
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dimension might overstate the effect of the dimension of decentralization actually used or
underestimate the effect of the decentralization reform as whole.
Second, oftentimes one dimension decentralizes faster and deeper than the others.
Furthermore, sometimes one of the dimensions might not experience any decentralization
at all. This situation has consequences on the effects that the overall decentralization
reform may have on any given socio-economic or institutional variable. This is a
widespread occurrence in most countries with this reform, but it is particularly common
in developing and transition economies. For example, in Poland, administrative and
political decentralization were initiated with a ―big bang‖ approach with the purpose of
spreading democracy and democratic values in the early years of the transition but
finances still do not match the same level of administrative and political responsibilities
and consequently local governments are still struggling to cope with overwhelming
financial mandates (Regulski 2003). In Bolivia, municipal governments increasingly have
more autonomy over a larger amount of financial resources; however, all the
administrative decisions regarding personnel are taken still at the central level (World
Bank 2005). Pakistan has recently experienced an important reform regarding political
and administrative devolution.14 However, its sub-national governments remain fiscally
dependent on the federal government15 (World Bank 2005). In each of the examples
provided, the overall effect of decentralization reforms would depend on the cumulative
effect generated by each individual dimension.

14

Administrative devolution is particularly significant at the provincial level. However, from the provincial
to the local levels there are still different degrees of administrative decentralization. In many cases
provinces have kept much of the administrative decision making (World Bank 2005).
15

Local governments are heavily dependent on the provincial governments through which transfers from
the center flow downwards (World Bank 2005).
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Third, cross-country comparisons countries from a single decentralization
perspective present important caveats. Indeed, considering the mismatches described
earlier one wonders how two countries can be compared in terms of decentralization from
only one dimension. In the examples above, how can it be argued that Poland is more
decentralized than Bolivia or that Pakistan is more centralized than Poland? Considering
only one dimension is like analyzing only one third of the picture.
Fourth, the interaction or inter-linkages between two dimensions (or more)
dimensions of decentralization could generate an additional or ―extra‖ effect on given
dependent variable; in other words, the whole can be larger than the sum of the parts.
This effect may be the result of mutually reinforcing aspects of the decentralization
dimensions. For example, it could be argued that higher local fiscal autonomy (i.e.,
higher fiscal decentralization) could generate additional positive results on local service
delivery (that is, more efficiency due to a better match of public spending with local
needs) when administrative decentralization grants power to local governments on
decision-making over personnel delivering those services, or when political
decentralization pushes local officials to be accountable to local needs on public local
spending. That is, while each dimension of decentralization reform might have an
independent effect in its own right, the reinforcing aspects of having more than one
dimension could produce an additional value.
These reasons for accounting for all dimensions of decentralization are obviously
interconnected and at the end they amount to one key argument: the threat of model
misspecification and the potential of misleading results.
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A Simple Framework
This section provides a basic framework to examine the relationship between
decentralization and service delivery by discussing selected aspects of this relationship
and by examining the process of providing services at the local level. This discussion also
aims to inform the construction of the empirical models used in Chapter 4 of this study.
The Choice of Dependent Variable: Outputs (Access) vis a vis Final Outcomes In Service
Delivery
Most of the cross-country research conducted on the effects of different
institutional reforms on service delivery evaluate the impact of the institutional reform (i)
on a final outcome of a public service (fo) (for example infant mortality rates or
education performance), assuming broadly the following function:

fosj  f (esj , isj , csj ) (3.1)
Where esj represents expenditures in service s, within country j and isj is
typically measured as a discrete variable to quantify the presence of institutional reform;

csj is a set of control variables that may also have an effect on fo.
The key problem examining service outcomes is that the function above (3.1), or
any function framing the relationship of an institutional reform (including
decentralization) and final outcomes of service delivery, is that it can not realistically
contain all the relevant variables that may impact significantly a final outcome (fo).
Demographic factors, geographic and weather conditions, political environment, and
cultural issues, all need to be considered. More importantly the quantity and quality of
other public (or private services) can have a large impact as well. For example, infant
mortality rates may be impacted by poor health condition in mothers, which is caused by
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the lack of access to water provision and the quality of water consumed. Infant mortality
rates may also be affected by a large concentration of mosquitoes under poor sanitary
conditions which exacerbates malaria prevalence rates in mothers and other care giver, or
by the lack of education of parents, which is an impediment for them to take
precautionary measurements in their children health. In the case of education, better
nutrition and better health care may help children to achieve better results at school
(WDR 2004). Household income, cultural factors, and parents’ level of education may
affect student completion rates and performance in standardized tests, and so on (Fuchs
and Woessmann 2004).
Moreover, all these independent factors may be interacting at the same time in
ways we do not fully understand. Uphoff (1992), for example, argues that the effects of
government policies in service delivery are subject to many uncontrollable external and
cross-sectoral influences and thus final outcomes are usually a fuzzy indicator of specific
service problems and achievements. Thus, while recognizing that complete of full model
specification is virtually impossible, all these omitted (and unobserved) factors, spurious
effects, and interactions make the examination of institutional reforms (such as
decentralization) and final service outcomes very difficult, leaving ample space for under
or over statement and spurious effects and attribution problems.
Therefore, a better aim is to step back and provide a more robust and direct
approach to evaluate the effects of decentralization reform on service delivery. This study
proposes the use of intermediate outputs, namely variables that measure access to
services, rather than final outcomes, so the effect is more direct. In most countries,
intermediate outputs and access are at the center of the problems with public service
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delivery. In the case of health care, intermediate outputs (or access variables) are
basically availability of doctors, access to medical facilities and medical personnel to
receive basic health care services, and immunization treatment coverage, among others.
In the case of water provision, an intermediate output is access to improved sources of
drinking water, through household connection to running water or other nearby reliable
access to drinking water.
A Traditional Service Delivery Structure
A graphic scheme of service delivery can also lend itself to illustrate the influence
of decentralization reform in outputs of service delivery. Figure 3.1 shows a pipeline in
the production of a specific service s (in this case health care). This figure succinctly
shows the upstream pipeline of delivering a service, which starts with inputs such as
financing, management, and decision making (including political power to do so) in
setting the service delivery platform. These inputs allow the production of a service by
paying salaries for doctors and nurses (and other relevant personnel), purchasing needed
supplies for treatments, providing maintenance, acquiring medical equipment, and
improving facilities.
These initial outputs, in turn, help directly in the production of some intermediate
outputs of the service that are closely related to access such as immunization coverage,
access to birth delivery services, maternal care, etc. At the end of the pipeline this should
lead to outcomes related to improved health status for the population such as lower rates
of infant mortality (as shown in the example of Figure 3.1). But (as argued earlier in this
section) this latter step in not fully a direct consequence of a proper production of a
specific service or health program because there are a number of variables also affecting
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that final outcome that are related to health care provision itself (see Figure 3.1). Note
that the basic production of a service could take place in a centralized or decentralized
framework, but this study would move to that discussion later in this chapter.
Infant mortality
rates.
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Source: Author based on modified service program structures from WHO and the World Bank

Figure 3.1: A service delivery pipeline: The case of health care

A traditional Service Delivery Structure, Decentralization and Key Considerations
Building on the last sub-section, Figure 3.2 connects decentralization reform to
the initial inputs of the traditional way to look at the delivery pipeline of a service (shown
in Figure 3.1). While, Figure 3.2 is not a representation of service delivery in a
decentralized context (which is addressed later in this chapter) but rather introduces the
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idea that each of the key initial inputs to produce services can be significantly influenced
by the three dimensions of decentralization reform.
Indeed, fiscal decentralization can change the way in which financial resources
are allocated across service sectors and within sectors, with potential implication to the
levels of technical and allocative efficiency (as discussed in Chapter 2). Administrative
decentralization can change how staffing and other supply side resources are re-allocated
to increase or decrease the size of a specific service in each sector. Finally, political
decentralization has the potential to increase accountability by improving responsiveness
and responsibility of officials, bureaucrats, and service providers. The importance of the
multidimensional approach to evaluate the effects of decentralization on service delivery
and other socio-economic variables is further discussed below.
There are, however, key considerations regarding service provision in a
decentralized framework that need to be discussed up front. In most countries, local
governments have a role in delivering key services. When setting the expenditure
responsibilities among levels of local government, a number of aspects and questions
need to be examined. For example, what is the balance between economies of scale in
providing a service s (that is, to help achieving technical efficiencies in service s) and
properly tailoring services to local needs (that is, allocative efficiency)? Other critical
questions are: what is the right size of local government in a particular country to produce
service s? what is the local government capacity to produce and manage effectively and
efficiently service s? what are the externalities of such provision across jurisdictions?
What are the national priorities in specific sector and service (See Beasley and Coate
2003; Bird et al. 2003; Lockwood 2002)
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Figure 3.2: Decentralization and Its Effect on Inputs on a Traditional Service
Delivery Pipeline
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The answers to these, and other questions, would help policy makers to decide at
what level of government a specific service should be provided. Each specific service is
likely to require a different level of government for its delivery. For example, primary
health care requires immediate proximity to the patients and delivers less specialized
health care services, and thus, it might be located at the smallest size of local government,
secondary and tertiary health care, which have a higher level of specialization in
treatments might need an intermediate or higher level of government to allow enough
resources and serve with economies of scale to a larger population group. This situation
further challenges our ability to model service delivery in a decentralized context.
Service Delivery and the Multidimensional Decentralization Reform Context
The vast majority of the research related to decentralization and service delivery
focus on a single dimension of this reform. Expanding on the function 3.1 and assuming a
symmetric level of decentralization across jurisdictions in a country, consider the
following function:

 L F   L A   LP  
aosj  f  Fsj sj ,  Asj sj ,  j , ci j  (3.2)
 Fsj   Asj   Pj  
Where ao is an intermediate output of (or a measure of access to) service s in
country j; F represents public budget resources devoted to service s; A represents
administrative or managerial powers in handling the delivery of service s; P represents
broad political and legislative powers in the country; and c accounts for variables that
shape the economic and institutional context of country j. In the case of financing
resources, L can be interpreted as the local share of financing (F) (that is, 0  LFj  1 )
over which a local government has fiscal autonomy or strong discretion either in how
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resources are collected or in how they are spent (Appendix A provides a detailed
discussion of how to assess fiscal autonomy at the country level). Note that a local
government may have specific financing sources to cover a specific service s, or it may
have a broad allocation of resources (from different sources) to cover a mandated basket
of various services, or as in most countries, a mix of both. Thus, the function 3.2 is a

 LFsj Fsj 

 F  is called
 sj 

generalization. In the econometric models presented in Chapter 4 

fiscal decentralization or FD (Appendix A also introduces some of the challenges
measuring fiscal decentralization due to its multi-faced structure and the complexities
that may be involved in its design). In the case of administrative decision-making powers
(A), L denotes one or several key administrative power that allow local governments
more autonomy and flexibility is deciding over staffing, resources, and levels of

 LAsj Asj 

 A  can be sector
 sj 

provisions that match their needs in service s. Commonly, 

specific (e.g., administrative decisions of staffing in health care for an specific service
assigned to a local government) or functional (e.g., staffing decision across all
responsibilities assigned to a local government); in the econometric models presented in
Chapter 4 this is called administrative decentralization or AD . In the case of political
power (P), L simply denotes a key element that would allow local political power and
consequently certain level of local political accountability; such as having locally elected
leaders that would consider local preferences (of their constituents) to shape service
delivery policy accordingly. in the econometric models presented in Chapter 4 this is
called political decentralization or PD
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Additionally, the control variables c for country j could be further sub-divided
into two groups: (i) specific economic conditions and country characteristics; and (ii)
institutional characteristics that may influence service delivery outputs such as the level
of corruption and the level of citizen participation to enhance accountability.
Relationship of Fiscal, Administrative, and Political Decentralization with Service
Delivery in Decentralized vis a vis Centralized Frameworks
Figure 3.3, which is a modification of the service delivery framework used by the
World Bank’s World Development Report (2004), illustrates accountability relationships
among the key actors in a centralized vis a vis a decentralized system of service
provision. As Ahmad et al. (2005) argue only understanding the relationships between
central policy makers, local governments, service providers, and citizens policy makers
can fully understand why decentralization reforms can, and sometimes cannot, lead to
better service delivery.
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Central
Government
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Ministry
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Local branch of
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Corrupt
Practices
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Spans from delegated to a devolved system: likely to have
higher revenue and expenditure autonomy; range from some
administrative powers granted to significant administrative
autonomy; more likely to have main executive local
authority elected locally.

Source: Author’s modified version of the World Bank’s World Development Report 2004—service
delivery framework.

Figure 3.3: Accountability lines in more and less decentralized service delivery
systems.
Moreover, Figure 3.3 illustrates the importance of each dimension of
decentralization in delivering public services. In this figure, Rondinelly’s (1981) three
decentralized modes (de-concentration, delegation, and devolution --discussed in chapter
2) are merged into two: a de-concentration mode, and a mode that goes from delegation
to devolution. Moreover, these modes of decentralization are aimed to reflect how central
and local policy makers, service providers, and citizens are inter-linked under the three
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broad dimensions of decentralization: fiscal, administrative, and political. For example,
local governments may have some degree of fiscal decentralization, but if they do not
have the autonomy to manage its human resources (for example, the ability or hire and
fired personnel is not an power of the local government but rather one that belongs to a
central line ministry) they may be unable to tailor services to local preferences in an
efficient manner.
Further, if local officials are not democratically elected by their local constituents,
there could be a weak link of accountability to local citizens, since appointed officials are
accountable to the center, and thus they may pursue different preferences from those of
local constituents. On a different case, if political decentralization is in place, but local
governments do not have the necessary resources or administrative autonomy to take
decisions, local officials may loss credibility and citizens would not have an incentive to
pay taxes to be spent on improving local public services. Thus, theoretical rationales of
allocative efficiency, technical efficiency, and local knowledge of preferences and needs
arising from a decentralized framework may suffer as a consequence.
The accountability relationships shown in Figure 3.3 are central to the theory that
decentralized frameworks can produce better quantities and quality of services. If
authorities performing functions at the local level are not accountable to their
constituents, at least to some degree, fiscally (through the revenue or expenditure side),
administratively and politically, the expectation that decentralized provision would lead
to better services might be partly eroded.
The relations between central policy makers and citizens vis a vis local policymakers and citizens could also be portrayed in the following way: because national
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constituencies are so large and heterogeneous, they may be unable to hold national
policy-makers accountable for their very specific preferences; in other words,
heterogeneous national constituencies might make the process of accountability harder as
there is much more divergence in their preferences. At the same time, central policy
makers may not be able (or willing) to address all the different constituencies’ problems
in a way that satisfies local needs, as they only need to pursue selected policies to keep
themselves in power. In a decentralized system of service provision local governments’
policy makers are accountable to smaller constituencies, which allows for clearer links
between a limited number of policies and responsibilities, delivery of those
responsibilities and results that locally perceived; that is, clearer or more direct
accountability lines (see Figure 3.3 above).
Bardham and Moherkee (1998;2000a; 2000b) offer an important caveat in this
regard. They argue that knowledge of local needs coupled with decentralization powers
might allow increased efficiency in service delivery but only if local government
authorities want to use that knowledge for improving services. In the case of ―elite
capture‖ of local governments, they argue those efficiency gains may not be likely. This
implies that even locally elected authorities may not deliver the expected quantities and
quality of services if they instead decide to personally rent from the resources received
for delivering services.
This in turn means that a model involving decentralization and service delivery
should also include some control variables related to institutional environment, for
example those in Figure 3.3, related to the level of corruption and the level of citizen
participation in policy making. The level of corruption would be associated with local
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elites capturing power for rent-seeking purposes, which can change priorities of policy
making toward privileging small groups as oppose to the majority of the citizens’ needs
in the jurisdiction. Moreover, aside from the supply side of accountability, that is, the
obligation of elected officials to be responsible for delivering public services (Przeworski
and Stokes, 1999), other means of demand-side accountability may have an influence in
improving service delivery (Ahmad et al. 2005). Demand-side accountability is basically
that generated through the power of constituents who elect (and change) periodically their
leaders, but also refers to citizen participation and opinion in public matters, through free
media, or through mechanisms such participatory budgeting, published score cards, and
so on (Ahmed et al 2005, World Bank 2007)
Conclusion
The components of a framework to examine the relationship of decentralization
reform and service delivery discussed above are, to some extent, complex and multifaced. But all of them: the multi-dimensional context of decentralization reform, the
element that pertains to defining what we want to measure in service delivery, and the
inter-linkages between the actors in decentralized or centralized framework of service
delivery are extremely relevant to undertake research in this field. Within the context of
this analytical framework the next chapter attempts an empirical examination of the
effects of decentralization policy on access to heath care and water provision services.
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CHAPTER 4
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF
DECENTRALIZATION AND ACCESS TO SERVICES: THE CASES OF
HEALTH AND WATER PROVISION
This chapter examines the effects of decentralization on access to public services using
cross-country panel data from 1990 to 2002.16 More specifically, this chapter evaluates
the effects of all three dimensions of fiscal decentralization on variables that account for
access to services in health care and water provision.
Hypotheses
Based on the arguments and the framework provided in Chapter 3, the following
three hypotheses would be tested: (1) Increased fiscal, political, and administrative
decentralization have a positive effect on access to health care and improved water
sources for the population; (2) higher levels of (and changes toward higher) fiscal
decentralization have a stronger positive effect on access to health care and improved
water provision for the population in developing countries than in developed countries;
and (3) the inter-linkages of at least two of the dimensions of decentralization (fiscal,
administrative, and political), if they are in place in a country, generates an extra positive
(that is, beyond each individual dimension) effect on access to services of this reform.
The General Models
This study evaluates the effects of decentralization on access to health care and
water provision services. For hypotheses 1 and 2 the following general regression is
used:

16

During this time span, four points in time 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2002 are used due to the data
characteristics and availability.
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A' kit   0   1 FDit   2 PDit   3 ADit   4   it'   u it (4.1)

Where the dependent variable A represents a measure of access to health care or
access to improved drinking water provision services for country i for time t (in the
subsequent sections AS would be disaggregated into access to health care and water
provision variables). The independent variables FD, PD, and AD are measures of fiscal,
political, and administrative decentralization, respectively; these variables are aimed at
testing Hypothesis 1.
Developed countries tend to be more decentralized than developing countries. At
the same time, developed countries have a higher level of access to services. In regression
analysis this can depicted by creating a simple dummy for developed countries, which
would show a higher intercept. To test hypothesis 2 this analysis takes a step further by
creating an interaction term between the fiscal decentralization variable and a simple
dummy generated for developed countries. This interaction term is represented by  (in
4.1 above), more specifically:  =  * , where  is a representation of the level of
decentralization (for simplicity using only fiscal decentralization FD) and  is a dummy
variable that denotes country group as in developed (D)or in transition (T)(former
socialist block). The purpose of this interaction term  is to examine if changes in 
have different effects on access to services in developed countries compared to
developing countries, and in transition countries compared to all other countries.
Additionally,  is the set vector of parameters arising from  , which represents
a set of control variables that include: (i) country institutional environment such as the
level of corruption and the availability of channels for citizen participation in policy
making, (ii) economic conditions and cycles such as per capita GDP and GDP growth,
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and (iii) country characteristics such population density and population living in rural
areas; u is the error term.
To test hypothesis 3 the following general regression is used:
Akit   0   1 FDit   2 PDit   3 ADit   4 it   it'   u it (4.2)

Where  is an interaction term that contains at least two different dimensions of the
decentralization process (out of the three FD, PD, and AD). That is, the model tests the
following interactions combinations: (i) FD*PD; (ii) FD*AD; and (iii) PD*AD
As discussed in more detail in the next section PD and AD are dummy variables, but
dummy variables that vary in time. That is, in t =0, PD may have a value of zero when a
measure of political decentralization such as having locally elected leaders is not in place
but this may change in t=2,3, or 4 . The same situation applies to AD. The dataset spans
from 1990 through 2002 (using four observations in time for each country), a time frame
that was very rich in decentralization reforms throughout the world.
Choice of Variables and Data
This research uses a cross country unbalanced panel dataset that includes 110
developing, developed, and transition countries and four points in time for each country
(1990, 1995, 2000, 2002). The panel is unbalanced because some countries in the dataset
have missing values for one year for some of the independent variables, which eliminates
the whole observation under some specifications of the models. The dataset was
constructed using several data sources briefly described throughout this section.17

17

See Appendix 1 for a detailed list of all variables (and their sources) used in the empirical analysis.
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Dependent Variables
The case made in Chapter 3 as regards to using output and access measures
related to service provision instead of final outcomes as dependent variables when
evaluating the effects of decentralization (or any other institutional independent variable)
was followed in selecting the variables described below.
In the case health care, the following variables were selected: (i) the percentage of
births attended in health facilities, (ii) the percentage of births attended by skilled
(trained) personnel18, and (iii) the immunization coverage for dipththeria, pertussis,
tetanus (DPT) (in percent). The first two variables listed above measure primary health
services and provide a good account of relative access to an essential health care service.
These variables come from the country databases of the World Health Organization
(WHO) for various years, and the United Nations Millenium Indicators database. The
third variable is a critical output of preventive health care and also embeds a
straightforward sense of access. This variable comes from the World Development
Indicators (WDI) produced annually by the World Bank.
Table 4.1 below provides a summary of statistics of the dependent variables used
to account for access to health care services. Additionally, Table 4.2 shows that all the
selected dependent variables related to health care access are highly (and positively)
correlated with each other, which allow some flexibility and more option in selecting
model specifications.

18

Includes certified midwives.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Access to Health Care Variables
Dependent Variables
% of birth attended in health
facilities
% of birth attended by skilled
personnel
Inmunization coverage for DPT
(%)

Obs (n)

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

427

0.7130

0.3019

0.01

1

426

0.7708

0.2815

0.02

1

440

0.8153

0.1838

0.18

1

Table 4.2: Correlation Matrix for Variables Measuring Health Care Access
% of birth attended in % of birth attended
Inmunization
health facilities
by skilled personnel coverage for DPT (%)
% of birth attended in
health facilities
% of birth attended by
skilled personnel
Inmunization coverage
for DPT (%)

1
0.9323

1

0.6175

0.6663

1

For the dependent variable that accounts for access to water provision the
following variables are considered: (i) the percentage of a country’s population with
access to improved drinking water sources, (ii) the percentage of a country’s rural
population with access to improved drinking water sources, and (iii) the percentage of a
country’s urban population with access to improved drinking water sources. These
variables come from the United Nations Millenium Indicators database and the World
Development Indicators of the World Bank. These sources (as well as WHO) define
improved drinking water sources ―in terms of the types of technology and levels of
services that are more likely to provide safer drinking water than unimproved
technologies. Therefore, improved water sources include household connections, public
standpipes, boreholes, protected dug wells, protected springs, and rainwater collections;
and unimproved water sources are unprotected wells, unprotected springs, vendor-
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provided water, bottled water (unless water for other uses is available from an improved
source) and tanker truck-provided water‖. 19
These variables are the quintessential measures of access in water services. Table
4.3 below provides a summary of statistics of the dependent variables used to account for
access water provision. Table 4.4 shows that all the selected dependent variables related
to access to water provision services are highly and positively correlated.
Table 4.3: Summary statistics of variables related to access to water services in the
database
Dependent Variables
% of total population with
access to improved water
sources
% of rural population with
access to improved water
sources
% of urban population with
access to improved water
sources

Obs (n)

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

424

0.8218

0.2028

0.2

1

409

0.7378

0.2427

0.1

1

418

0.9158

0.1325

0.32

1

Table 4.4: Correlation Matrix for Variables Measuring Access to Water Provision
Services
% of total population
% of rural
% of urban population
with access to
population with
with access to
improved water
access to improved
improved water
sources
water sources
sources
% of total population with
access to improved
water sources
% of rural population with
access to improved
water sources
% of urban population
with access to improved
water sources

1

0.9104

1

0.8368

0.7213

19

1

See World Health Organization www.who.org and the United Nations Millenium Indicators database at
www.un.org
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Core Independent variables
As discussed earlier, decentralization is a complex multi-dimensional process that
involves fiscal, administrative and political aspects. Moreover, each of these dimensions
is multi-faceted. The cross-country empirical literature has measured fiscal
decentralization as shares/ratios of sub-national fiscal resources (revenues or
expenditures) to total public fiscal resources, using primarily the data of the Government
Finance Statistics (GFS) Dataset of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). While these
measures can be criticized for being too rough in measuring the actual degree of fiscal
decentralization in a country, they remain the preferred alternative as they rely on data
with consistent definitions across a large number of countries and over time. As Huther
and Shah (1998) argue, comparable and meaningful cross-country data are essential in
order to learn about the decentralization policy. Moreover, it has become clear that
detailed data with information about all main aspects of fiscal decentralization and local
fiscal autonomy, that is comparable across countries, are not attainable in the near future.
This study, as others in the decentralization empirical literature, uses the
following measures as a proxy for fiscal decentralization (FD)20: the ratio of sub-national
expenditures to total expenditures (FD ed) and the ratio of sub-national revenues (net of
transfers) to total revenues (FD rd). These measures are compiled from the International
Monetary Fund Government Finance Statistics (GFS) for the years 1990, 1995, 2000, and
2002. The caveats of using these rough measures of fiscal decentralization are substantial.
Appendix A raises key factors behind measuring appropriately the level of fiscal
decentralization and puts forward a framework (for discussion) to support future detailed

20

Other variables considered are explained in Appendix 2.
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data collection of the multi-faced aspects of fiscal decentralization and fiscal autonomy.
Appendix A aims at fostering discussion and building consensus on an appropriate
framework for measuring fiscal decentralization as necessary step before more
comprehensive data is collected uniformly across countries.
Administrative decentralization is also multi-faceted in nature since it refers to
different aspects of local decision-making power to deliver services. They include:
personnel management, ownership and management of service facilities, management of
other material resources in the sector, and administrative discretion over day-to-day
operations.21 To proxy administrative decentralization, this study uses one of the core
administrative functions that could be decentralized to local governments: personnel
management. Most practitioners in the field would agree that this is perhaps the core
administrative function in relation to service delivery at the local level. To do so, a
dummy variable that indicates whether sub-national governments have autonomy to hire
and fire people is used. This dummy variable is time-variant, that is, it may take values of
zero or one for the same country in different points in time (t). For example, in t =0, AD
may have a value of zero when a country (j) does not have the administrative discretion
to hire and fire, but this may change in t=2,3, or 4 if legislative changes take place
allowing such discretion. This dummy variable is generated combining the database of
Political Institutions DPI (World Bank 2002), Treisman (2002), WB-OECD dataset on
local autonomy (2004), and World Bank Development Policy and Country Reports.

21

It is important to point out, however, that guidelines and rules on how the health care services should be
performed, quality standards of health facilities and procedures, or quality standards of water are and
should be typically set at the central level of government. All other functions are distributed between
central and sub-national levels depending on the level of decentralization.
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There are also different facets to the political decentralization process. It can be
examined by looking at whether sub-national authorities are locally elected; or by looking
at what authorities are elected at the sub-national levels: executive local authorities or
local legislative bodies. To complicate things more a country typically has more than one
level of sub-national government, and political devolution of power to these levels might
be different. Finally, political decentralization can also be examined by looking at certain
institutional arrangements such as the voice and vote power of sub-national governments
in changes to national legislation (on issues that might affect local government) at the
central level. The latter is also linked to how sub-national constituents are represented in
the national parliament.
To account for political decentralization this study uses two main variables. The
first variable used ―political decentralization at the municipal (local) level‖ (PD le)
indicates if municipal executive leaders are locally and democratically elected or not.
This dummy variable will take the value of 1 if both a local elected assembly and the
executive head of local government are locally elected. Further, countries may have rural
and urban local governments at the same level of local government, so the dummy
variable takes a value of 1 if at least one local of local government (e,g, cities) has a
locally elected council and locally executive head of local government. The second
variable used ―political decentralization at the state level‖ (PD se) indicates if
state/province/regional leaders and their legislature are democratically (and locally)
elected or not. In this case, the dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the state, province,
or region has either an elected council or an elected head of the executive province (or
region) government, or both.
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Similarly to the dummy used for administrative decentralization, the two dummy
variables used to account for political decentralization vary in time, that is, they may take
values of 0 or 1 for the same country in different points in time. This is because in many
countries in the sample, the political decentralization setting changed over the time span
of our dataset. These variables was generated using the Databases of Political Institutions
DPI (World Bank) and Treisman (2002), background data of the World Development
Report 2000, and World Bank Development Policy Reports and Country Reports. Table
4.3 display summary statistics for all the decentralization variables used in this study.
Table 4.5: Summary statistics of decentralization variables
Dependent variables
(Decentralization)
Revenue
Decentralization
Expenditure
Decentralization
Administrative
Decentralization
Political
Decentralization at the
municipal level
Political
Decentralization at the
state level

Obs (n)

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

418

0.191

0.131

0

$0.608

396

0.211

0.150

0.008

$0.890

424

0.203

0.403

0

1

398

0.603

0.490

0

1

424

0.453

0.498

0

1

Additionally, Table 4.6 presents some correlation patterns among the
decentralization variables. While the measures of fiscal decentralization, revenue
decentralization (FD rd) and expenditure decentralization (FD ed) are highly correlated,
measures across different dimensions of the decentralization process are much weakly
correlated. The latter supports a chief argument made throughout this study, that is, since
each dimension may decentralize at a different speed and level, it is critical to look more
comprehensively at this reform when doing empirical analyses.
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Table 4.6 Correlation Among Decentralization Variables
Fiscal
Fiscal
Administrative
Political
Political
Decentralization Decentralization Decentralization Decentralization Decentralization
(Revenue
(Expenditure
(AD)
at the local level
at the
Deentralization) Deentralization)
(PDle)
state/province
FDrd
FDed
level (PDse)
Fiscal Decentralization (Revenue
Deentralization) FDrd
Fiscal Decentralization (Expenditure
Deentralization) FDed
Administrative Decentralization (AD)
Political Decentralization at the local
level (PDle)
Political Decentralization at the
state/province level (PDse)

1
0.8064

1

0.2757

0.2257

1

0.1886

0.122

0.3898

1

0.3528

0.2796

0.3311

0.5957

1

This study also generates a dummy variable called ―D‖ that takes the value of 1
for developed countries (and an interaction term using D and fiscal decentralization—
discussed earlier in this chapter) to examine differences of the effects of decentralization
on services in developed countries vis a vis and developing and transition countries. This
study does the same for a dummy variable called ―T‖ that takes the value of 1 for
transition countries. As pointed out earlier, developed countries tend to be more
decentralized across all dimensions and tend to have higher levels of access to service
due their more advance income situation. This can be clearly observed from the data of
this study by applying a simple two-sample
t-test as shown in Table 4.7a,b,c,d,e, using the dummy variable ―D‖ against all three
dimensions of decentralization and selected variables on access to health care and water
provision services.
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Table 4.7a: Developed countries vs developing and transition countries as regards to
levels of fiscal (revenue) decentralization.
Fiscal decentralization
(revenue decentralization)
Group
0
1 (developed countries-- D)
combined
difference

Obs

Mean

Std. Err.

Std. Dev. [95% Conf.

Interval]

342
76

0.165
0.312

0.006
0.015

0.116
0.131

0.152
0.282

0.177
0.342

418

0.191
-0.147

0.006
0.015

0.131

0.179
-0.177

0.204
-0.117

Table 4.7b: Developed countries vs developing and transition countries as regards to
levels of administrative decentralization.
Administrative
Obs
decentralization
Group
0
1 (developed countries-- D)

Mean

348
76

0.144
0.474

0.019
0.058

0.351
0.503

0.107
0.359

0.181
0.589

combined

424

0.203

0.020

0.403

0.164

0.241

-0.330

0.048

-0.425

-0.235

diff

Std. Err.

Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]

Table 4.7c: Developed countries vs developing and transition countries as regards to
levels of political decentralization (at the local level).
Political Decentralization
(local)
Group
0
1 (developed countries-- D)

Obs

Mean

Std. Err.

Std. Dev. [95% Conf.

Interval]

326
72

0.531
0.931

0.028
0.030

0.500
0.256

0.476
0.870

0.585
0.991

combined
diff

398

0.603
-0.400

0.025
0.061

0.490

0.555
-0.519

0.651
-0.281

Table 4.7d: Developed countries vs developing and transition countries as regards to
access to health care (% of births attended in health facilities).
% of birth attended in health
facilities
Group
0
1 (developed countries-- D)

Obs

Mean

Std. Err.

351
76

0.654
0.986

0.016
0.002

0.302
0.014

0.622
0.982

0.686
0.989

combined
diff

427

0.713
-0.332

0.015
0.035

0.302

0.684
-0.400

0.742
-0.263
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Std. Dev. [95% Conf.

Interval]

Table 4.7e: Developed countries vs developing and transition countries as regards to
access to water provision
% of total population with
access to improved water
sources
Group
0
1 (developed countries-- D)
combined
diff

Obs

Mean

Std. Err.

Std. Dev. [95% Conf.

Interval]

348
76

0.784
0.996

0.011
0.001

0.205
0.012

0.762
0.993

0.805
0.999

424

0.822
-0.212

0.010
0.024

0.203

0.802
-0.259

0.841
-0.166

Control Variables
Following up on the case made in chapter 3 regarding institutional aspects in
service delivery, this study uses two variables to account for the institutional environment
of the country: ―control of corruption‖ and ―voice and accountability.‖ Both are
extracted directly from the dataset ―Governance Matters‖ of the World Bank, which
contains data from 1996-2006.22 This study uses data for 1996 (which were collected
from sources dated in 1995), 2000, and 2002. The variable ―Control of corruption
depicts the level of corruption in the country through an aggregated index of dozens of
corruption measurements reported by multilateral agencies, watch dogs agencies, public
and private think thanks and other organizations (e.g., Transparency International,
regional development banks, the Heritage Foundation, Gallup International) that include
perception of corruption of government officials of several sources, perception of
nepotism, patronage in key policy makers, frequency of bribery in the economy,
frequency on bribery to connect to public services and public utilities. The methodology
to construct these aggregate measures and a detailed desegregation of each index by
source can be found in Kaufmann, Kray, and Mastruzzi (2004).
22

Governance Matters III is a dataset developed at the World Bank by Kaufman et al. (2003).
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The variable “voice and accountability,” also from the Governance Indicators of
the World Bank, depicts the level of citizen participation in policy making and to some
extent accountability in the country through a composite index of dozen of variables
related to channels of communication between citizens and the government, and social
interaction among citizens aimed to overlook government activities. The variables in this
index include: voter turnout in national and local elections, civil liberties (i.e., freedom of
speech, freedom of association, freedom of press), independence of the media, political
rights, perception on the accountability of public officials, transparency of government
policy.
The authors of these composite measures of corruption and voice and
accountability acknowledge that individual measures based on perceptions always carry a
problem of measurement error. However, they also argue that the aggregation and
cleaning process of outliers that they undertake generates an aggregate measure that is
likely to be better than any individual measure inside the index. Kaufmann, Kray, and
Mastruzzi (2004, 2006, 2008) provide detailed discussion on the reliability of their
aggregated measures.23 These two measures show that better control of corruption is
correlated with higher levels of voice and accountability as shown in Table 4.7 below
(additionally summary statistics for these variables are available in Appendix B).
For control variables related to the economy of a country, per capita income in
constant U.S dollars of 2000, and per capita GDP growth are used. Controlling for the
level of per-capita income in a country is important since countries at higher levels of
income tend to have better and higher quality service delivery systems (including access

23

Further discussion can also be found at www.worldbank.org.
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and intermediate outputs in service delivery). These controls variables come from the
World Development Indicators produced annually by the World Bank.
In several models this empirical analysis also controls for the level of public
spending through the ratio of public expenditure in health to GDP and for the overall
level of per capita expenditure in health care provision. However, it is also important to
point out that these variables are highly correlated with the level of per-capita income in a
country (see Table 4.8), and thus not all controls are used in all model specifications.
The variables are also extracted from the World Development Indicators dataset of the
World Bank. (summary statistics for the variables described above are available in
Appendix B)
Table 4.8: Correlation Matrix of Control Variables
Voice and
Accountability
Voice and Accountability
Control of
Corruption
Public Expenditures in
Health as % of GDP
Per capita expenditures
in Health
Per capita GDP (in
constant 2000 USD)

Control of
Corruption

Per capita
Per capita GDP
Public Expenditures in
expenditures in
(in constant
Health as % of GDP
Health
2000 USD)

1
0.8442

1

0.7102

0.736

1

0.689

0.8083

0.763

1

0.7113

0.8292

0.7255

0.9751

1

Estimation Methods and Econometric Issues
For the two general models highlighted earlier, this study applies three different
econometric estimation methods: (i) Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with Fixed Effects,
(ii) first differencing, and (ii) system general method of moments (System GMM). The
fixed effects and first-differencing methods have a similar purpose, namely controlling
for country specific invariant effects. The aim of doing first-differencing in parallel to
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fixed effects is to check the robustness of the coefficients for our independent variables of
interest as these methods employ different methodological approaches. First-differencing
places a harder strain on the data (i.e., variables) and model specifications, which helps in
that objective.
This section discusses how these econometric estimation methods fit the
hypotheses and models we discussed earlier given the nature of the data and variables in
this research.
Fixed Effects
Given the cross-country nature of the dataset used in this research, there is a
strong rationale for choosing fixed effects estimation to account for potential unobserved
differences across countries. The use of fixed effects estimation is quite common in the
literature that examines cross-country variables. In its most basic shape the fixed effects
estimation can be represented in the following way:

yit  1 xit  ci  uit

(4.3)

Where xit are a set of k =1,…,6 set of independent variables that change in time
(t). ci represents unobserved or omitted variables such as country specific characteristics
that are time invariant. By subtracting y i from y it in (4.3) for each period of time t, ci
can be eliminated (Wooldridge 2002). Here it is important to point out that under strict
exogeneity assumption (that is,

E ( yit / yit , ci )  xit  ci ) on the explanatory

variables ( xit ) the fixed effect estimator is unbiased. Nevertheless, the fixed effect
estimation allows for arbitrary correlation between ci and the set of variables
(Wooldridge 2002, Greene 2000)
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xit

Applied to our general models and further elaborating, we would have the
following equations representing our original (4.1) and (4.2) equations, respectively:
N

T

j 1

s 1

Akit  α1 FDit  α 2 PD  α3 AD  α 4(FDit*ψ i )  χ it' β   α j ct j,it   γ s td s,it  εit (4.4)
N

T

j 1

s 1

Akit  α1 FDit  α 2 PD  α3 AD  α 4(λit )  χ it' β   α j ct j,it   γ s td s,it  ε it (4.5)

Note that country individual and time dummies are applied. The N-1 individual
country dummies cdj,it equal 1 if i=j, and equal zero otherwise. The T-1 time dummies
tds,it equal 1 if t=s, and zero otherwise.
Key to the fixed effects estimator is to the assumption of homoskedasticity of the

uit. Furthermore, checking for the problem of serial correlation in a panel time series
such as the one used here is critical to the efficiency of the estimators. Thus, following
the procedure described in Wooldridge (2002) and Cameron and Trivedi (2005)—
which is in turn is based on White (1980) and Eicker (1967)— the standard errors for
models (4.3) and (4.4) were estimated using a panel robust estimate of the asymptotic
variance matrix which controls for both serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.
First Differencing
Another way to control for country specific differences and other omitted
variables (represented as ci in equation (4.3)) is to perform first-differencing. As
discussed earlier, this method put an increased stress on the variables and models. This
method basically does the following transformation to eliminate the unobserved time
invariant country effects of our data:

yit  xit   uit (4.6)
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Where yit = y it - y i ,t 1 ; the same is done for the independent variables and the
error term. Applying this method to the general models (4.1) and (4.2) we would have the
following:
A     (FD )   (PD )   AD   (( FD * ))  ( ' )   it (4.7)
kit
o
1
it
2
it
3 it
5
it
i
it

Akit   o  1 (FDit )   2 (PDit )   3 ADit   5 (it )  ( it' )   it (4.8)

where Akit  Akit  Aki ,t 1 ;  it   it   i ,t 1 ;  it   it  Ai ,t 1 ; i=1,..,N; t=2,..,T
Since we have a small T (i.e., T=4) and a relatively large N, the difference in the
efficiency of estimators between the ones generated by the fixed effects and the firstdifferencing methods would basically depend on the level of serial correlation in the
idiosyncratic errors (Wooldridge 2002). Thus, if on one extreme uit are serially
uncorrelated then the fixed effect estimator would be more efficient; and if on the other
extreme uit follows a random walk then the first-differencing estimator would be more
efficient. Since there is only a very mild serial correlation in the errors, both fixed effects
and first differencing estimators are performed and reported later.
To control for both serial correlation and heteroskedasticity, the standard errors
for the first-differencing models, which results are presented and discussed in the next
section, were computed using a panel robust estimate of the asymptotic variance
matrix—described in Wooldridge (2002) and Cameron and Trivedi (2005) (see also
White 1980).
System Generalized Method of Moments (System GMM)
The issue of endogeneity is sometimes raised when looking at the effect of
institutional reforms on some development indicators, particularly when the left hand side
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variable in the regression is a measure of economic growth. However, this is not
common in the literature related to the effects of decentralization on different variables
related to service delivery using cross-country analysis (Treisman 2002)(see also
literature review in Chapter 2 for a discussion of the most typical relationships evaluated
in the literature of this topic). As Chapter 3 discusses, understanding why decentralization
reform is initiated is important, and while a significant portion of the literature suggests
that decentralization reform is exogenous to service delivery, the issue is remains
unresolved since a counterpoint could also be made (see Chapter 3). The rationale that
can be articulated against exogeneity is straightforward: documented international
experience shows that decentralization processes in most countries did not start with the
objective of improving public services and economic efficiency, but rather they were
initiated owing to political reasons (regional tensions, power sharing agreements, and
other of similar kind). The counter argument is that under-provision or regional
inequality in service provision could be part a reason for regional tensions or a reason for
deepening decentralization reforms already in place.
Thus, to provide a more complete examination, this study addresses the
possibility of endogeneity through the use of the System GMM estimation method. Good
―external‖ instrumental variables that, in a way, can reflect the trends of the
decentralization process and are readily available for use, do not exist. The situation is
even worse if we look for suitable time variant instrumental variables for each dimension
of the decentralization process. The only way is to use ―internal‖ instruments, thus, to
deal with the issue this research uses an estimation method called system generalized
method of moments or simply ―system GMM‖. This is a modified version of the
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―difference GMM‖ method developed by Arellano and Bond (1991)24 widely used to
deal with endogeneity issues in panel (time series) data through the use of lagged
variables and a sophisticated construct with a number of properties as briefly explained
below.
The original Arellano and Bond (1991) ―difference GMM‖ treats the regression
model as a system of equations, one for each t . The predetermined and suspect
endogenous variables in first differences are instrumented with suitable lags of their own
levels. Strictly exogenous regressors, as well as any other instrumented variables (i.e.,
suitable lags of existing independent variables), and are lumped into a matrix using first
differences, with one column per instrument. Both GMM estimators (that is, ―difference
GMM‖ and the newer ―system GMM‖) were designed for dynamic panels that have
―small T and large N‖ (that is, few periods in time and many individual observations), a
linear relationship; a dependent variable that is dynamic, independent variables that are
not strictly exogenous, fixed individual effects (in our case country effects), and
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals (Roodman 2007; see also
STATA 10 manuals 2007).
As articulated by Bond (2002) and Blundel and Bond (1999) the problem with the
original ―difference GMM‖ estimator is that lagged levels can sometimes be weak
instruments when using first-differenced estimators, and more so for series that are highly
persistent (that is, those that follow close to a random walk). Moreover, these estimators
can also be subject to large finite sample biases (Blundell 2002)

24

The difference GMM draw on the original Generalized Method of Moments first introduced by Hansen
(1982)
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The ―system GMM‖ estimation we use in this research was developed by
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). A simple way to differentiate
this innovation from the original method (i.e., difference GMM) is provided by Roodman
(2006) who states that while the ―difference GMM‖ instruments differences (or
orthogonal deviations) with levels, the system GMM instruments levels with differences.
Indeed, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) add transformed
equations in levels to the system, helping to increase the efficiency of the estimators,
particularly for panels with small number of time periods (i.e., small T) (see Monte Carlo
simulations supporting this point in Bond 2002 and in Blundell and Bond 1998). In these
added equations, suspect endogenous variables in levels are instrumented with suitable
lags of their own first differences. All the assumptions and workings for this procedure
are articulated in detail in Blundell and Bond (1998) (see also Roodman 2006).25
The proposed estimation applied to our original models would be as follows:
Akit  o  1(Aki , t  1)   2 (FDit )  3 (PDit )   4 ADit  5 (( FDit * i ))  (it' )   it

(4.9)

Akit   o  1 (Aki ,t 1 )   2 (FDit )   3 (PDit )   4 ADit   5 (it )  ( it' )   it (4.10)

The regression ran using "system GMM" offered consistent estimates since error
terms between panels are not correlated (e.i. Δεit is not correlated with Δεi-1,t ). Standard
errors for this model were estimated using Windmeijer’s (2000 and 2005) finite-sample
correction in order to correct for possible bias in the two-step estimator covariance matrix
(see also Roodman, (2006))

25

While the operationalization of the ―difference GMM‖ in a STATA command has been in use for many
years, the command for the ―system GMM‖ for STATA is rather recent (developed by Roodman 2006).
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Discussion of Results
Hypotheses 1 and 2
The regression results obtained through three different estimation methods (fixed
effect, first differencing, and system GMM) generally provide evidence supporting
hypotheses 1 and 2.

Under most specifications of the general model 4.1 (discussed

earlier in this chapter) the results show a positive and statistically significant effect of
fiscal, administrative, and political decentralization on the variables used to measure
access to health care and improved water source provision. These relationships are
independently discussed below.
Decentralization and health care access
Table 4.9 show two sets of specification models each run through the three
estimation methods selected (discussed earlier). Models specifications 1, 3 and 5 use the
percentage of births attended in health facilities as dependent variables; and models 2, 4,
and 6 use the percentage of births attended by skilled personnel as dependent variables.
As regards to hypothesis 1, the regression results show that the effects of fiscal
decentralization and administrative decentralization across most model specifications are
statistically significant and with the expected (positive) signs. More specifically,
estimations roughly predict that 1 percent increase in fiscal decentralization (that is, 1
percentage point more in sub-national revenues over total revenues) may increase the
percent of births in health facilities in a country by a range of 0.22 percent to 0.5 percent
depending on the specification in the OLS fixed effects model. Fiscal decentralization
(particularly revenue decentralization) is highly significant across specifications and
model estimations, even at 1% significance level in some cases. Administrative
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decentralization also has a positive and significant effect in the regressions (including at
the 1% level in several specifications), although not in all model specifications.
The effect of political decentralization is significant only in one specification in
Table 4.9 and in other specifications shown in Appendix C, but clearly the significance of
this variable is not robust across specifications (a number of additional regression results
and model specifications for this relationship can be found in Appendix C)
These results strengthen the case argued through this research about the
importance of accounting for all dimensions of the decentralization process when
investigating the effects of this reform on any economic, institutional, or social variable.
The broad policy implications of these results are highly relevant. As discussed in this
research, decentralization reform implemented only through one dimension may render
fewer positive fruits in terms of access to services than a multi-dimensional approach.
Moreover, the specific results presented in Table 4.9 it also show the strength and
importance of fiscal and administrative decentralization processes for improving access
to basic health care services.
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Table 4.9: Estimation results on decentralization effects on health care accessHypotheses 1 and 2
Dependent Variable

=====>

Estimation method -------------------->
Model Specification

Independent Varibles /1
Fiscal (revenue) Decentralization (FD rd)
Political Decentralization (local/municipal) (PD le)
Administrative Decentralization (AD)
Developed Countries Dummy (D)
(D*FDrd)

% of births attended in health facilities (model specifications 1, 3, 5)
% of births attended by skilled personnel (model specifications 2,4,6)

Fixed Effects

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.499
[2.73]***
0.013
[0.66]
0.044
[2.75]***
0.122
[1.86]*
-0.525
[2.70]***

0.224
[1.81]*
0.036
[2.01]**
0.037
[1.92]*

0.48
[2.62]**
0.030
[1.36]
0.027
[1.70]*
0.000
[.]
-0.46
[2.47]**

0.334
[2.18]**
0.016
[0.60]
0.044
[2.76]***

-0.029
[0.28]
0.035
[0.64]
0.061
[3.02]***
0.000
[.]
-0.256
[1.05]

0.739
[2.01]**
-0.014
[0.29]
0.013
[0.41]

(T*FDrd)

Voice and Accountability

0.0009
[2.99]***
-0.013
[1.00]

Control of Corruption
Per capita health expenditure /2
Constant
Observations
R-squared

System GMM

(2)

Transition Countries Dummy (T)

GDP per capita /2

First Differencing

(1)

0.021
[0.73]
0.776
[13.90]***
286
0.99

0.801
[30.96]***
-0.053
[0.22]
0.0010
[2.36]**

-0.015
[0.96]
0.022
[1.27]
0.021
[1.30]
280
0.99

0.0018
[2.39]**
0.013
[0.82]

0.012
[0.16]
0.00
[0.23]
148
0.32

0.000
[.]
0.082
[0.28]
0.0020
[0.32]

0.014
[0.84]
0.014
[0.47]
-0.001
[0.20]
150
0.29

Number of panels

0.0006
[1.93]*
0.092
[2.41]**

0.000
[.]
-0.469
[1.09]
0.0008
[0.51]

0.025
[1.23]
0.281
[5.26]***
216

0.135
[2.33]**
0.022
[2.62]***
0.615
[4.62]***
224

94

98

Panel robust t and z statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies, as well as lagged executed Y and T variables from the GMM are omitted in the table
2/ Units transformed (in thousands)

To test Hypothesis 2, recall that an interaction term between the fiscal (revenue)
decentralization variable (FDrd) and a dummy created for developed countries (D) was
generated (that is, FDrd * D –see discussion of this term earlier in this chapter). This
interaction term is aimed at depicting a different slope in the effect of fiscal
decentralization on access to health care services for developed countries as opposed that
effect for non-developed countries (i.e., developing and transition countries). The same
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was done for a second dummy created for transition countries (T) (with the interaction
term T * FDrd). Again the objective was to check if changes in fiscal decentralization
have a different effect on access to health care in transition countries compared to the
rest.
The results obtained for this vector (i.e., negative sign) support the expectation of
Hypothesis 2 that developed countries would benefit less from increased decentralization
perhaps given their already higher level institutional and economic consolidation. The
results are highly significant in model 1 and 3 in Table 4.9.
These results imply that developing countries could benefit significantly more
from decentralization than developed countries. Thus, the policy implications are
important for reforms in the developing countries. If indeed a decentralization process
can produce larger positive effects on access to basic health services in these countries,
designing adequate decentralization frameworks could help significantly in increasing the
quality of life of their citizens through better access to services, which would, together
with other aspects, contribute to improve health outcomes of the population. This
research pursued a similar approach to observe different effect for transition countries,
but the results were rather inconclusive.
Some of the control variables for institutional environment also produced
interesting results (see table 4.9 and Appendix C), although not across all specifications.
In some models, positive changes in the variable representing accountability and citizen
participation and control of corruption had a positive impact on access the health care
variables.26 That is, showing that improving the level of citizen engagement in policy

26

The models regressed contain only one of these institutional variables in each specification. As discussed
earlier the two variables used (control of corruption and voice and accountability) are highly correlated.
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making and social interaction among citizens aimed to overlook government activities
(—or accountability) and improving control over corrupt practices increases access to
basic health care services. As expected the control variable for level of income was also
significant across most specification in Table 4.9. This was expected because in higher
income countries the population tends to have higher levels of access to basic services, as
discussed earlier in this chapter.

Fewer specification models showed per capita

expenditures in health as statistically significant, especially in the presence of the income
variable.

This perhaps occurred because the income variable absorbed most of the

explanatory power in our specification models.
Decentralization and Access to Improved Water Sources
As in the case of health, the results support the strategy of using all three
dimensions of decentralization in the same model to have a clearer picture of
decentralization reform effect on access to services. Table 4.10 shows the results of this
reform on access to improved water source. Even though we see statistical significance
for all three dimensions in several specifications (see also Appendix C), the
decentralization dimension that shows more robustness is political decentralization at the
local (municipal) level (PDle). The size of the coefficients attached to fiscal
decentralization are smaller in the case of access to improved water source than in the
case of health care, though still statistically significant across most specifications.
Administrative decentralization also seems to play a key role in delivering a better access
to this service, although this variable was not significant in all specifications.
Overall it seems that having locally elected municipal leaders and councils matter
a great deal for improving access to improved sources of drinking water. This somewhat
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contrasts with the case of health care, where political decentralization seemed less
important. One could explain this by relating it to the structure of governments and how
they are organized to provide public services. That is, health care has a well-established
central line ministry in each country with significant non-discretionary spending (wages,
utilities and other recurrent spending), and changes in fiscal and administrative
arrangements, if properly done through local governments, may have the potential of
increasing efficiency and access in services provided (as discussed earlier). In contrast,
water provision, which is typically provided locally, is commonly dependent in more than
one line ministry (or several central agencies) for its provision. Moreover, water
provision enhancement projects are mainly driven by discretionary investments, which in
turn are more commonly subject to political bargaining and patronage. The latter also
implies that strong and locally elected politicians at the local level (where this service is
delivered almost in its entirety) may be needed to generate positive changes. This finding
is very much in line with the country studies and related literature reviewed in Chapter 2,
which points heavily towards the importance of local politicians in improving water
services.
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Table 4.10: Estimation results on decentralization effects on access to improved water
source - Hypotheses 1 and 2
Dependent Variable

=====>

Estimation method -------------------->
Model Specification

Independent Varibles /1
Fiscal (revenue) Decentralization (FD rd)
Political Decentralization (local/municipal) (PD le)
Administrative Decentralization (AD)
Developed Countries Dummy (D)
(D*FDrd)

% of people with access to improved water source (model specifications 1, 3, 5)
% of rural people with access to improved water source (model specifications
2,4,6)
Fixed Effects

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.444
[1.20]
0.025
[2.50]**
-0.005
[0.38]
-0.167
[0.81]
0.72
[0.89]

0.021
[0.61]
0.053
[3.71]***
0.014
[1.06]

0.16
[2.09]**
0.027
[2.71]***
0
[.]
0
[.]
-1.552
[2.96]***

0.132
[1.80]*
0.034
[3.21]***
0.021
[2.20]**

-0.061
[0.39]
0.058
[2.05]**
0.027
[1.14]
0.057
[0.92]
-0.059
[0.37]

0.033
[0.29]
0.06
[2.15]**
0.03
[0.87]

0.246
[11.02]***
-0.157
[1.61]
0.0012
[0.06]
-0.016
[0.82]
0.677
[29.51]***
279
0.98

(T*FDrd)

Voice and Accountability
Constant
Observations
R-squared

System GMM

(2)

Transition Countries Dummy (T)

GDP per capita /2

First Differencing

(1)

0.0018
[0.69]
0.003
[0.23]
0.256
[10.65]***
272
0.96

0.0012
[0.93]
0.001
[0.10]
0.005
[0.65]
136
0.40

0
[.]
-0.135
[1.41]
0.0007
[0.68]
-0.018
[1.05]
0
[0.14]
146
0.26

Number of panels

0.0021
[1.96]**
0.002
[0.06]
0.323
[3.83]***
219

0.115
[0.89]
0.123
[0.25]
0.0026
[0.66]
0.007
[0.19]
0.326
[2.96]***
219

96

96

Panel robust t and z statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies, as well as lagged executed Y and T variables from the GMM are omitted in the table.
2/ Units transformed (in thousands)

The results obtained for the interaction term created to test hypothesis 2 once
more yielded a negative sign and showed significance but only in few model
specifications (one of them in Table 4.10). As in the case of access to health care, the
negative sign for developed countries here means that developing countries gain more in
relation to access to improved drinking water sources from changes toward higher levels
of fiscal decentralization. These results (as well as the ones discussed earlier) have
important policy implications. As discussed in several parts of this research access to
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drinking water is a core developmental issue in poorer countries, and possibly a basic
pillar to improve living standards in general. This is particularly evident in the poorest
countries in Africa and Asia where safe drinking water impacts people’s health and
education outcomes (including mortality rates) and overall living conditions (WDR
2004).
For countries where water access is an acute problem a deeper political
decentralization process might help (as a component of a broader reform agenda) to
resolve the bottlenecks in the system that prevent improvement in access to improved
sources of drinking water. As argued throughout this research, improving access to
services may not be just an issue of financing. Thus, if decentralization has the potential
of improving access to this service, its multi-dimensional design acquires further urgency
and importance in the framework of institutional reforms.
Hypothesis 3
The regression results obtained through three different estimation methods (fixed
effect, first differencing, and system GMM) provide some evidence in support of
hypothesis 3, though it is not as robust compared to that obtained for hypothesis 1. One
explanation for this may be that the way in which administrative and political
decentralization variables are measured, that is, with dichotomous variables that change
over time. This situation does not allow for sufficient variation in estimation methods
such as the ones used here which put significant strain on the data.
Nevertheless, under several specifications of the general model 4.2 (discussed
earlier in this chapter) the results show an additional positive and statistically significant
effect of the interaction of two decentralization dimensions on access to health care and
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water services, that is, a positive effect in addition to the statistically significant and
robust positive effect of each decentralization variable individually measured in the
regressions. Recall that the aim of these interaction terms is to examine if, in addition to
each dimension independently measured, the interaction between two dimensions
(whichever they may be) would create an additional (or extra) positive effect on access to
services such as health care and water provision. These relationships are discussed
below.
Decentralization and health care access
As in the other regressions discussed so far, the variables accounting for fiscal
decentralization, political decentralization, and administrative decentralization show,
individually, a positive and statistically significant effect on health care access. Table
4.11 shows regression results using the percentage of births attended in health care
facilities and the immunization coverage (percentage) of DPT as dependent variables that
measure health care access (additional regression results and model specification for this
relationship can be found in the Appendix C).
Among the possible interaction terms between two dimensions of fiscal
decentralization, four specific interactions showed to be positive and statistical significant
at the 10 percent and 5 percent significance level, and in one case; these are the
interactions between: (i) fiscal decentralization (revenue decentralization) and political
decentralization (officials elected at the municipal level); (ii) fiscal decentralization and
administrative decentralization (relative autonomy to hire and fire personnel); and (iii)
administrative decentralization and political decentralization.
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Table 4.11: Estimation results on decentralization effects (with interactions) on health
care access- Hypothesis 3
Dependent Variable

=====>

% of births attended in health facilities (model specifications 1, 3, 5)
Immunization coverage (%) for DPT (model specifications 2,4,6)
Fixed effects

Model Specification

Independent Varibles /1
Fiscal (revenue) Decentralization (FD rd)
Political Decentralization (local/municipal) (PD le)
Administrative Decentralization (AD)

(1)

(2)

First Differencing

(3)

0.231

0.298

0.12

0.1

0.745

[2.02]**
0.035
[1.99]**
0.045

[2.26]**
0.046
[2.04]**
-0.009

[2.05]**
0.045
[3.84]***
0.043

[0.41]
0.025
[0.59]
0.17

[2.50]**
-0.004
[0.09]
0.115

[2.76]***

[1.86]*

[0.54]

[2.21]**

[1.65]*

[2.10]**

0.047
0.077
[2.76]***
0.0020
[2.06]**

Voice and Accountability
Control of Corruption
Public health expenditure as %of GDP

0.0092
[0.92]
-0.016
[1.03]

-0.019
[0.88]
0.035

-0.121

[1.57]

Observations
R-squared

0.0099
[0.36]
0.011
[0.72]

[1.88]*
0.015
[1.75]*
0.0017
[0.93]

0.0084
[1.45]
0.082
[1.78]*

0.158
[3.14]***
0.048

[0.09]

0.864
[16.99]***
284
0.94

0.0504

[1.67]*
0.036
[1.66]*
0.0026
[0.18]

-0.017
[1.59]
0.06

Per capita health expenditure /2
Constant

(6)

0.06

[2.04]**

GDP per capita /2

System GMM

(5)

[0.39]
0.053
[2.28]**
0.057

(FDrd*AD)
(AD*PDle)

(4)

[1.65]*

0.004

0.003

0.005

[0.64]
0.809
[17.34]***
280
0.99

[1.42]
-0.002
[1.76]*
283
0.3

0.346
[3.69]***
220

[2.17]**
0.58
[5.89]***
224

96

98

0
[0.05]
139
0.37

Number of panels
Panel robust t and z statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies, as well as lagged executed Y and T variables from the GMM are omitted in the table.
2/ Units transformed (in thousands)

The rationales behind these results (and behind the interaction between
dimensions of decentralization) have been discussed in detail in Chapter 3, but in short,
these results provide some support for the argument that additional positive value arises
from the cross-linkages between decentralization dimensions, which goes beyond the
individual contribution of each dimension. In our analysis, this added value manifests
itself as better access to health care, and potentially it works its way through several
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avenues, including: (i) higher autonomy in the decision making on how to use public
resources and thus better match between local public spending in local needs, as
theoretically expected; (ii) better match between local needs and local public spending
due to local accountability; and (iii) local autonomy in decision making of resources
supported by the legitimacy of locally elected officials.
From the results discussed it is clear that all three dimensions of decentralization
are important individually. Moreover, there seems to also to be an extra value added
(aside from the positive effect of each individual dimension) arising from the interlinkages and mutually reinforcing effects of having more than one dimension of
decentralization in place. This, in turn, implies that by not having a multi-dimensional
approach to decentralization reform countries may be losing out on positive effects on
access to health care services. A second key corollary policy implication is that
decentralization results depend heavily on reform design. Design issues, including those
within each dimension (recall that each dimension also embeds several facets), are at the
forefront when decentralization processes are evaluated in detail (See Appendix C for a
detailed discussion on assessing the different facets of fiscal decentralization). Finally, a
third implication is that decentralization reform is a process in itself and might gain over
time from added dimensions and the deepening of the dimensions implemented over
time.
Decentralization and Access to Improved Water Sources
The variables accounting for fiscal decentralization, political decentralization, and
administrative decentralization (individually) show positive and statistically significant
effects on access to improved water source, although similarly to the discussion on this
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relationship for hypotheses 1 and 2, political decentralization is the most robust variable
across specifications (see Table 4.12 and Appendix C). The results shown in Table 4.12
as regards to the interaction terms suggest that three interactions between dimensions of
decentralization seem to matter. The interaction between fiscal decentralization (revenue
decentralization) and political decentralization (officials elected at the municipal level)
and fiscal decentralization and administrative decentralization show significance only at
the 10% confidence level (and not so robustly across model specifications). The
interaction between, administrative decentralization and political decentralization in
several model shown in Appendix C shows significance but not across model
specifications. Also, these results are not robust across estimation methods.
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Table 4.12: Estimation results on decentralization effects (with interactions) on access to
improved water source - Hypothesis 3
Dependent Variable =====>
% of people with access to improved water source
Fixed Effects

First Differencing

System GMM

Model Specification

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Independent Varibles /1
Fiscal Decentralization (FD rd)

0.16

0.14

0.16

0.12

0.251

-0.035

[2.20]**
0.056
[3.28]***
0.022

[2.08]**
0.041
[3.47]***
0.048

[2.47]**
0.065
[3.63]***
0.021

[2.05]**
0.045
[3.84]***
0.043

[1.91]*
0.093
[2.28]**
0.024

[0.25]
0.024
[0.57]
0.021

[1.74]*

[2.23]**

[1.90]*

[2.21]**

[1.07]

[0.46]

Political Decentralization (PD) le
Administrative Decentralization (AD)

(FDrd*PDle)

-0.093

0.121

-0.179

[1.25]

[1.66]*

[1.26]

(FDrd*AD)
GDP per capita /2

0.0021
[0.76]

Constant
Observations
R-squared

0.132

0.19

0.101

[1.60]
0.0018
[0.67]
0.886
[47.31]***
383
0.98

[1.67]*
0.0007
[0.38]
-0.002
[1.76]*
283
0.3

0.0028
[0.74]
0.239
[2.24]**
285

[0.67]
0.0021
[1.88]*
0.241
[3.10]***
285

97

97

Number of panels

0.0012
[0.56]
-0.002
[1.64]
283
0.3

Panel robust t and z statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies, as well as lagged executed Y and T variables from the GMM are omitted in the table.
2/ Units transformed (in thousands)

Note that political decentralization is present in both interactions, which is
consistent with the results obtained earlier for this variable. The policy implications are
quite similar to those articulated earlier for the case of decentralization and access to
healthcare, and thus reiteration would be redundant. But perhaps one important variation
in the relation between decentralization and access to improved drinking water source,
that is, the political decentralization dimension continues to be the variable that matters
most for increasing access to improved water source for citizens. Therefore, in countries
where access to improved water sources is thought to be the most acute problem,
reformers may have to consider an ―authentic‖ and deep political decentralization as the
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core pillar of the decentralization process27, while accompanying the process with
administrative and fiscal measures to strengthen local accountability.

27

Recall from Chapter 3 that countries tend to advance more one dimension of decentralization than the
other two. This seems rather a natural process that depends on country conditions, characteristics, and
political environment.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
While most countries have initially pursued the process of decentralization of
powers to local governments seeking political and regional stabilization and changes in
governance through power sharing, improved service delivery has been cited as an
argument for continuing and deepening this reform. Many of the anticipated benefits of
decentralization are based on the premise that this policy would bring local decisionmakers closer to their constituents and their needs. Thus, and along the reasoning of the
fiscal federalism literature, local decision-makers would be able to better tailor services
and public spending patterns to local needs improving access, efficiency, and quality of
services.
This research builds further on the existing conceptual framework of
decentralization and service delivery and provides an empirical examination of the effects
of decentralization reforms on access to two key services: health care and improved
drinking water sources. This study is particularly motivated by four factors. First, a
critical question in development economics is what kind of institutional reforms
developing and transition countries should undertake to improve basic service delivery;
and decentralization is commonly discussed as one of such reforms. Second, despite the
existence of a large body of literature on the impact of decentralization on government
size, growth, and macro-economic stability, there are fewer studies that have evaluated
the effects of decentralization on service delivery across countries. Third, most of the
research conducted on this relationship evaluates the effects of the decentralization on
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final outcomes of public services (e.g., infant mortality), which presents a number of
attribution and spurious effects problems, instead this research uses access to services or
intermediate outputs to establish a more direct link. And fourth, the vast majority of
empirical literature in this topic has analyzed decentralization from a single dimension,
that is, either: fiscal, administrative, or political; but not from all three dimensions
simultaneously, which seems to be critical and it is attempted in this study.
The following three hypotheses were evaluated: (1) changes toward higher levels
of fiscal, political, and administrative decentralization (all) help to increase access to
health care and improved water sources for the population; (2) changes toward higher
levels of fiscal decentralization have a stronger positive effect on access to health care
and improved water provision for the population in developing countries compared to
those effects in developed and transition countries; and (3) the inter-linkages of at least
two dimensions of the decentralization present in a country would further increase the
overall positive impact on access to services of this reform.
The regression results obtained through three different estimation methods
provide evidence supporting a positive and significant effect of fiscal, administrative, and
political decentralization, individually, on the variables used to measure access to health
care, though the positive impact of political and administrative decentralization were
smaller in size than that of fiscal decentralization, though still robust across
specifications. In contrast, for the case of access to improved water provision, while all
three dimensions of decentralization dimension showed a positive effect, political
decentralization at the local level (that is, locally–municipal- elected leaders) level
showed the strongest and most robust effect.
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These findings support the case argued throughout this study about the
importance of considering all dimensions of the decentralization process when
investigating the effects of this reform on any economic, institutional, or social variable.
The policy implications are highly relevant: decentralization implemented only through
one dimension may render fewer positive fruits in terms of access to services than a
multi-dimensional approach. The apparent larger impact of fiscal and administrative
dimensions in the case of health care might have important implications for the design of
decentralization strategies. Moreover, the strength of the effect of political
decentralization in the case of access to improved water source indicates that improving
access to this service is not just an issue of finance or administrative powers, but as it
appears one predominantly of local political accountability that can be complemented
with fiscal and administrative powers at the local levels to further strengthen local
accountability.
The results obtained also support the expectation that developed countries would
benefit less in terms of access to health care and water provision from changes in
decentralization (that is, increasing levels of decentralization) probably because of their
already strong service delivery platform and their higher level of institutional and
economic consolidation. At the same time, this finding implies that developing countries
could benefit significantly more from decentralization than developed countries. The
policy implications of the latter are highly relevant for policy makers in developing
countries in the context of on-going institutional reforms. If a decentralization process
can render larger positive effects on access to services, designing adequate
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decentralization frameworks in these countries could help significantly in increasing the
quality of life of their citizens through better access to services.
This study pursued a similar approach to observe different effects for transition
countries, but the results were rather un-conclusive, perhaps because most transition
countries inherited a rather strong service delivery system, that is, for their income level.
Although this does not rule out the benefits of deepening decentralization processes in
these countries given that there is evidence of service quality deterioration partly
attributable to lack of local autonomy to handle services at the local level and perverse
incentives centrally driven affecting budget formation at the local level (World Bank
2007; World Bank 2008).
The results obtained in this study also suggest that there is an additional positive
effect coming from the interaction of two decentralization dimensions on access to health
care and water services (that is additional to the individual effect of each dimension of
decentralization). Examining an ―extra‖ effect arising from the inter-linkages of at least
two decentralization dimensions was aimed at checking if the whole (effect of the multidimensional reform) was larger than the sum of the parts. Although the results are
significant only at 10% level (and in one case at the 5% level) they provide some support
for the hypothesis that those inter-linkages between dimensions have an extra positive
mutually-reinforcing effect on improving access to services.
The two interactions that were most commonly significant in the regressions for
the case of health care were that of:

fiscal decentralization and administrative

decentralization (autonomy to hire and fire personnel at the local level); and that of
administrative decentralization and political decentralization. In the case of access to
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improved access to drinking water, the two interactions that seemed to matter (but only at
the 10% confidence level) were that between fiscal decentralization (revenue
decentralization) and political decentralization (officials elected at the municipal level),
and that of administrative decentralization and political decentralization. Drawing on
these results, one could argue that this ―extra‖ value added in improving access to health
care and water provision could be occurring through several mutually reinforcing aspects,
for example, a better match between local needs and locally driven public spending due,
in part, to local political accountability.
In addition, the results of this study suggest that control variables related to the
institutional environment also produce interesting results. For example, positive changes
in the variable accounting for accountability and citizen participation (that is, improving
the level of citizen engagement in policy making and the communication between
citizens and the government and social interaction among citizens aimed to overlook
government activities—or accountability) had positive impact on access to health care in
the presence of decentralization reform. The opposite effect was found for the level of
corruption variable, although with few coefficients with statistical significance across
specifications.
There might a number of ways of interpreting the results of this study and the
readers should be cautious about any strong policy prescriptions based on them as well
known pitfalls of working with cross-country data also applies. Moreover, future research
could focus efforts on refining decentralization measures across countries. Single country
level work would continue to be interesting but specially if asymmetric decentralization
(that is, if asymmetric decentralization can be observed in a country) is analyzed across
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jurisdictions of a country (that is, examining how different levels of decentralization any
given socio-economic variable in each jurisdiction).

Nevertheless, findings of this study s support the premise that each dimension of
decentralization individually is highly relevant in their effect on access to services.
Moreover, there is some support to the belief that the inter-linkages between
decentralization dimensions generate further positive benefits for improving access to
services. Thus, it seems clear that countries not applying all three dimensions with a
coherent reform design would be loosing some of fruits this reform can offer as regards
to improving access to basic services such as health care and safe drinking water for the
population. Moreover, the results also support the premise that the relevance of
decentralization reform and its design is higher in developing countries.
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APPENDIX A
THE CHALLENGE OF EVALUATING AND MEASURING FISCAL
DECENTRALIZATION
Decentralization is a complex multi-dimensional process that involves fiscal,
administrative and political aspects. Moreover, each of these dimensions is multi-faced
by itself as it involves several features that need to be taken into account. Evaluating their
impacts on different socio-economic and institutional outcomes requires the ability to
asses each dimension of a decentralization process in a detailed way. To measure fiscal
decentralization in empirical work, researchers typically use the shares of revenues and
expenditures that flow through sub-national budgets, using the GFS data collected
annually by the IMF. While these measures can be criticized for being too rough in
measuring the actual degree of fiscal decentralization in a country, they remain the only
way to consistently make cross country comparisons over time.
Understanding that comparable data depicting in detail all the key aspects of fiscal
decentralization is non-existent for most countries, it seems clear as Bird (1995, 2001)
argues, that the empirical literature will likely have to live with the existing limitations.
Nevertheless, before efforts are placed on collecting more comprehensive data, it is
essential to develop consensus on a framework that contains the different aspects of fiscal
decentralization that are worth measuring, that can be measurable, and for which data can
be actually collected in the future across countries. Having consensus on such a
framework would also have a more immediate value added for researchers and policy
makers working in a single-country context by helping them to evaluate more precisely
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key components of the fiscal decentralization process and their relative level against
certain notional benchmarks.
This Appendix puts forward such a focused framework for discussion (it could
also be used on country specific analysis to determine the level of decentralization and
reforms needed in case the country decides to move further in the process). The focus of
assessment is in examining fiscal autonomy along the lines of the core pillars of the
design of fiscal decentralization reforms in a country: expenditure responsibilities,
revenue assignments, intergovernmental transfers, and sub-national borrowing.
A simple framework to asses fiscal decentralization
A series of different intergovernmental facets, schemes, and structures within a
country, need to be considered in building a framework for comprehensive measure of
fiscal decentralization. Consider:

FDi  f ( EAi , RAi , BPi ) (A.1)
Where FD is a Fiscal Decentralization Index for country “i” ; EA is a measurement of
local expenditure autonomy; RA is a measurement of revenue autonomy that includes tax
and non tax revenues and transfers from upper levels of local government; and BP is
measure of the level of the local government’s borrowing powers.
More specifically,

FDi  ( EAi * )  ( RAi * )  ( BPi *  ) (A.2)
Where  +  +  =1, and for simplicity  ,  , and  are equal.
Expenditure Responsibilities (EA)
Fiscal decentralization at the core involves the shifting of expenditure
responsibilities to lower levels of government. Assigning functions to sub-national
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governments inherently involves a shift of power away from the center (Bahl 1999).
Consequently, autonomy in the expenditure side is as important in measuring fiscal
decentralization as is revenue autonomy.
An important factor in determining the degree of fiscal decentralization is the
extent to which sub-national governments are given autonomy to determine the allocation
of the resources available to them. For instance, in most developing countries, a core
source of revenue for sub-national governments comes through transfers or revenue
sharing schemes from the center. These transfers can be structured in a way that subnational governments may have little discretion on how these resources are spent. The
degrees of discretion may vary even within this category of earmarked revenues, which
makes it difficult to measure expenditure autonomy. Moreover, as countries have several
of these schemes and each with different levels of discretion granted to sub-national
levels, that measurement becomes even more complicated.
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that these shares of tied (or untied)
spending resources are not the only factor that influences final spending allocation and
ultimately sub-national expenditure autonomy. In fact, it is essential to examine how the
expenditure responsibilities are decentralized.

A critical factor to account for is the

clarity of roles in spending responsibilities of central and sub-national governments. This
is necessary in order to reflect an accurate picture of fiscal decentralization. In some
cases, central and sub-national levels have clear and separate roles, but in others, there
are concurrent responsibilities and consequently central influence over sub-national
spending, which sometimes is not clear from reading the legislation and regulatory
framework of a country. For example, sometimes the national government assigns
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expenditure responsibilities to sub-national governments but keeps a great level of
discretion on critical decision-making processes. In other cases there is not clear
responsibility assignment and overlap occurs. In these cases, sub-national governments
often times have to follow unwritten orders from a ministerial branch of the central
government undermining discretion in the expenditure decision making.
Among scholars and experts on the topic, the consensus is that there is no single
best assignment of expenditure responsibilities to sub-national governments. Rather, this
assignment needs to fit to each country’s particular characteristics and sub-national
structure as well as general principles such as subsidiarity, efficiency (including
economies of scale), externalities, benefited areas, administrative feasibility, and political
accountability (Breton, Cassone, and Fraschini 1998 and Bird 2002). However, regardless
what is decided to assign to each level of government, it is important that all levels have
clear roles and responsibilities. Clarity of roles and functions assigned is essential in
providing fiscal autonomy to sub-national governments as it provides them with the
ability to work with accountability on the devolved functions.
Thus, consider:

EAi  (SDi *  )  ( ERi * ) (A.3)
Where  +  =1, and  = 
And SDi is a function of different shares of spending over which local governments have
discretion, that is:

SDi  f ( (a) percent of total local budget resources over which local governments do
not have discretion; (b) percent of total local budget resources over which
local governments have discretion but still have to follow certain sectoral (that
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is, line ministry) or central spending guidelines; (c) percent of total local
budget resources over which local governments have full discretion.)
And where ERi is a function of several qualitative aspects of expenditure autonomy, that
is:

ERi  f ( (a) are expenditure functions and specific responsibilities clearly assigned in
the legislation or regulatory framework (that is, clear cut roles)?; (b) is there some
overlapping in expenditure functions? if so, over what percent of the local spending
envelope; (c) do ministerial line representatives at the local impose rules that affect how
local budgets are formed in each sector?28; if so, over what portion of the local spending
envelope?)
Revenue Assignments and Intergovernmental fiscal transfers (RA)
On the revenue side, the the sub-national portion of revenues used to measure
revenue decentralization can be disaggregated to identify sub-national revenue autonomy
in each of its components29 as follows:
Sub-National Revenue =
Total Revenue

Own revenue + Shared revenues + Transfers
Total Revenue
Total Revenue

Or Disaggregating further:
Sub-National Revenue =

Own revenue + Shared Revenue (untied) + Unconditional transfers
Total Revenue
Total Revenue
Total revenue
+ Conditional transfers (*)
Total Revenue

(*) Includes the conditional (earmarked) portion of other revenue sharing schemes

28

This issue is also closely connected with administrative decision-making at the local level, which is
discussed in the main body of this dissertation.
29

In this desegregation we do not take into account revenues coming from borrowing, as this source
provides financing for covering deficits or for capital spending. However, as borrowing powers are part of
sub-national fiscal autonomy, they are discussed later in this section.
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Each of these components has embedded in itself a degree of autonomy granted
by the central government to sub-national governments. Combining and further
expanding on guiding principles presented by McLure (2000), Oliveira and MartinezVazquez (2001), and OECD (2002) the degree of autonomy of each of those revenue
components is discussed below.
Consider:

RAi  (ORAi *  )  (STAi * ) (A.4)
Where ORA is tax autonomy over own local taxes in country i.
Own source revenues are commonly considered to be free of any condition from
the central government, but this is not often the case. Thus, in terms of own source
revenues (for taxes and non-taxes) or ORA in our framework, the following questions
should be asked: (i) which level of government chooses the taxes (and fees) from which
sub-national governments receive their own local revenue; (ii) which level of government
defines the tax bases; (iii) which level of government sets tax rates; (iv) which level of
government administers the taxes (actual collection and other administrative related
functions). In some cases sub-national governments may not have the chance to define
bases, or choose their own taxes and rates, or administer these taxes. It can also be the
case the sub-national government can choose to impose certain taxes or charges out of a
given list authorized by the central government. In summary, there could be different
mixes of these features present in the regulations that own revenues have and ultimately
they are inherent in determining the degree of fiscal autonomy.
In a simpler way ORA could be rated from lower to higher autonomy as follows:
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ORAi  f [(a) sub-national governments do not have any power to set their own
revenues’ rates and bases; (b) sub-national government are assigned certain taxes they
have to collect and they have some flexibility on the rate; (c) sub-national governments
can pick their taxes (and fees) exclusively from an authorized list of options and can not
change rates; (d) sub-national governments can pick their taxes (and fees) exclusively
from an authorized list of options and have some flexibility in changing rates (within
bands); (e) sub-national governments can pick their taxes (and fees) exclusively from an
authorized list of options and have full discretion on rates; (f) local governments can
choose their taxes and rates;
and (g) additionally this could also be evaluated examining the portion of own source
sub-national revenues over which these sub-national governments have discretion at any
of the levels of autonomy mentioned above.]
STA is autonomy over transfer revenues and shared taxes (with the central
government) in country i, and can be disaggregated in following way:

STAi  f (USTAi ; SSTAi ; LSTAi )
Where USTA is most basic level to measure the degree of sub-national autonomy
in transfers and shared revenues, that is, the differentiation between the shares of
conditional (or earmarked) transfers and unconditional (or untied) transfers [for
simplicity, here we bundled untied shared revenues together with unconditional transfers,
and earmarked revenue sharing schemes together with conditional transfers]. Or,
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USTAi  f ( share of unconditional transfers (and untied shared revenues) over total
transfers and shared revenues).30
Conditional transfers (and earmarked revenue schemes) are typically tied to the
fulfillment of a specific function, for example: (i) financing salaries or utility bills; (ii)
financing capital expenditures; (iii) financing a specific service (e.g., education); (iv)
financing a specific bundle of local services (in this situation sub-national governments
may have some limited latitude or discretion in allocating the money within the service
sectors); or (v) financing any particular spending item in local budgets.
In the case of unconditional transfers (and untied shared revenues) it is clear that
local governments have discretion over the spending of these resources; however, it is
necessary to know if they carry out some sort of ―conditionalities‖. For example, such
―conditionalities‖ appear in supposedly unconditional transfers in Bolivia and El
Salvador, where some untied (block) transfers are considered ―unconditional‖ but still
have some investment restrictions behind them: in Bolivia and el Salvador a percentage
of the unconditional block grant has to be invested in infrastructure related to certain
services (Arze and Martinez-Vazquez 2003). Under the specific item of
intergovernmental transfers, the autonomy would be greater the larger the share of the
transfers in block (untied) transfers.
SSTA represents a portion of shared revenues and transfers over which local
government have certain voice in its determination and/or changes; SSTA can be
represented in the following way:

30

A higher share would denote higher sub-national autonomy.
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SSTAi  f [(a) percentage of revenue sharing schemes and transfers over which the
central government can not take decision unilaterally without agreeing with
sub-national governments;31 (b)percentage of revenue sharing schemes and
transfers that are set in legislation but rules may be changed by central
government unilaterally;32 (c) percentage of sharing schemes and transfers
that are determined unilaterally each year by the central government as part
of the national budget;33 (d) percent of shared revenues over which local
governments have voice in decision making regarding exemptions granted
on the base and changes in rate;34 (e) unconditional or block transfers as
percentage of total transfers35]
And, LSTA represents the degree of autonomy and stability for sub-national governments’
transfers and shared revenues that arises from the legal basis of the intergovernmental
transfer system. LSTA can be represented by the function below where (a) is the strongest
setting for the transfer system (in terms of autonomy and predictability) and (e) is the
weakest:

LSTAi  f [(a) the system is precisely determined by the constitution; (b) the general
principles are contained in the constitution and actual criteria are approved
with national law in agreement with sub-national governments; (c) the
system is decided by national law (budget code or other); (d) the system is
31

A higher percentage denotes more sub-national autonomy

32

A higher percentage denotes lower sub-national autonomy

33

A higher percentage denotes more sub-national autonomy

34

A higher percentage denotes more sub-national autonomy

35

A higher percentage denotes more sub-national autonomy
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decided each year in the annual budget law in agreement with sub-national
governments; (d) the system is decided each year in the annual budget law
and sub-national governments have no voice in its determination36;
Sub-national Borrowing
Often, this aspect has been neglected when analyzing case studies of fiscal
decentralization in different countries. However, it is increasingly important as the
process of decentralization moves forward. Typically, as decentralization unfolds, subnational governments see growing opportunities to borrow resources from the financial
sector and international donors. Although awareness of this issue is growing, many
countries do not regulate borrowing powers for sub-national governments. 37
In defining the degree of fiscal decentralization, accounting for borrowing
autonomy is extremely important. As Oliveira and Martinez-Vazquez (2001) argue,
transferring this responsibility to sub-national governments is an important step in
developing a sense of ownership at the local level, which tends to result in improved
capital infrastructure and efficiency in its financing. 38 Moreover, borrowing power may
become an independent mechanism for fostering sub-national accountability in countries
where the process of decentralization is fairly advanced. Indeed, the level of borrowing
autonomy is another indication of the degree of independence of sub-national
governments in their financing, and consequently in terms of measuring fiscal
36

This variable is very important for sub-national fiscal autonomy as it illustrates issues such as legal
ownership of revenues and transparency of the system.
37

In any case, a well-designed regulatory framework is necessary to ensure that the decentralization of
borrowing does not provide perverse incentives to the sub-national governments (Litvack and Seddon
2002).
38

Efficiency comes from the optimal allocation of long-term debt to capital expenditure. In addition subnational ownership and improved infrastructure may generate economic growth. See Oliveira and
Martinez-Vazquez (2001) for a discussion on this issue.
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decentralization in a country. 39 However, this aspect needs to be treated carefully and in
the framework of fiscal responsibility. For example, in countries with early stage
processes of decentralization, sub-national borrowing may be prudently limited and wellcontrolled as to avoid soft-budget constraints.
To measure sub-national borrowing autonomy we can use the following
framework, with borrowing powers (SNBP) classified in five levels from no power to
borrow (a) to significant powers to borrow (e)

SNBPi  f [(a) no sub-national borrowing at all; (b) sub-national borrowing with tight
ceilings (including debt ceilings on outstanding debt as percent of total
revenues, ceilings on annual debt repayments as percent of recurrent local
revenues or the like) and only with central government’s ex-ante control and
authorization; (c) sub-national borrowing with ceilings (relatively increased
compared to initial stages but still conservative) and only with central
government’s ex-ante control and authorization; (d) sub-national borrowing
with ceilings but only with ex-post (annual) control from central authorities,
tough debt registration is part of the process; (e) sub-national borrowing
without ceilings or controls but only for local governments with credit ratings
from internationally recognized rating companies (still registration applies)].
It should be highlighted, however, that as the system of sub-borrowing matures and subnational governments acquire more powers (or even from the very beginning) a proper

39

Here is important to make clear that we do not make the case for more or less borrowing power for local
governments. There are a variety of good reasons for which the autonomy in this regard could be restricted
such as macroeconomic stability, poor technical ability in risk evaluation of the sub-national governments
as so on; See Bird, Ebel and Wallich, (1995).
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sub-national bankruptcy framework should be in place to avoid moral hazards in lenders
and borrowers, and to increase local officials’ accountability.
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APPENDIX B: DATA SOURCES
VARIABLE NAME

Percentage of births attended in
health facilities
Percentage of births attended by
skilled personnel
Immunization coverage rates for
DPT (children under 1 year old )

Percentage of population with
access to improved drinking water
sources (total population)
Percentage of population with
access to improved drinking water
sources (Urban population)
Percentage of population with
access to improved drinking water
sources (Rural population)
Fiscal decentralization measured as
revenue decentralization and
expenditure decentralization
Administrative decentralization:
generated dummy variable that
indicates if sub-national
governments can hire and fire
people
Political decentralization
Municipal/local government
elections, answering the question if
municipal/local executive and
legislature are democratically (and
locally) elected.
Political decentralization
State/province elections, basically
answering the question if
state/province executive and
legislature are democratically (and
locally) elected
Citizen participation and
accountability
Perceived corruption in the country.

SOURCE

WHO (various years) and Millennium
Development Indicators, United Nations
(2003)
WHO (various years) and Millennium
Development Indicators, United Nations
(2003)
WHO (various years) and Millennium
Development Indicators, United Nations
(2003), World Bank Development
indicators
Millennium Development Indicators,
United Nations (1990-2003)
Millennium Development Indicators,
United Nations (1990-2003)
Millennium Development Indicators,
United Nations (1990-2003)
Government Finance Statistics –
International Monetary Fund (2006)
Combining Database of Political
Institutions DPI (World Bank 2002),
Treisman (2002). WB-OECD dataset
Budget Practices and Procedures (2004)
and DPR World Bank.
Database of Political Institutions DPI
(World Bank 2004) complemented by a
review of WB Development Policy
Reports and Country Reports made by
the author
Database of Political Institutions DPI
(World Bank 2002) complemented by a
review of WB Development Policy
Reports and Country Reports made by
the author
Governance Matters III (World Bank
2003)
Governance Matters III (World Bank
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Public per capita Expenditure in
each specific sector (i.e: health,
water provision)
Private per capita expenditure in
each specific sector (i.e: health,
water provision)
Income per capita; income per
capita growth.
Percentage of rural population in
the country

2003)
World Development Indicators (2003)World Bank.
World Development Indicators (2003)World Bank.
World Development Indicators (2003)World Bank.
World Development Indicators (2003)World Bank.

Summary Statistics of Control Variables
Control Variables
Voice and accountability
Control of corruption
Public health expenditure as
%of GDP
Per Capita GDP in constant
USD 2000
Per Capita GDP growth

Obs
330
319

Mean
0.1145
0.0499

Std. Dev.
0.9269
1.0265

Min
-1.81
-1.89

Max
1.72
2.48

401

0.0342

0.0196

0.00

0.09

90.19
-0.15

38200.41
0.25

439
437

5740.5730 8927.0580
0.0196
0.0430
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APPENDIX C: Regression Results
Table C-1: fixed effects estimation results on decentralization effects on health care
access- Hypotheses 1 and 2
Dependent Variable
Model specification

=====>

Independent Varibles /1
Fiscal Decentralization (FD) rd

% of births attended in health facilities
(1)
(2)
(3)
4)
0.29
[2.36]**

0.29
[2.36]**

0.018
[0.89]
0.05
[3.00]***
-0.012
[0.23]

0.018
[0.89]
0.05
[3.00]***

Political Decentralization (PD) le
Political Decentralization (PD) se
Administrative Decentralization (AD)
Developed Country (D)
(D*FD)
Transition Country (T)

0.401
[2.17]**
0.028
[1.61]

0.249
[1.67]*
0.036
[2.01]**

0.034
[1.89]*
0.123
[1.81]*
-0.429
[2.28]**

0.035
[1.96]*

-0.006
[0.11]

(T*FD)
GDP per capita /2
Control of Corruption
Per capita health expenditure /2
Constant

0.0009
[0.38]
-0.014
[1.03]
0.0218
[1.16]
0.824
[18.57]***
286
0.99

0.0011
[0.38]
-0.014
[1.03]
0.0205
[1.83]*
0.83
[11.65]***
286
0.99

Observations
R-squared
Panel robust t statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies are omitted in the table.
2/ Units transformed (in thousands)
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0.0012
[1.94]*
-0.014
[0.93]
0.0310
[0.84]
0.784
[15.86]***
280
0.99

0.825
[13.36]***
-0.114
[0.40]
0.0007
[0.29]
-0.015
[0.96]
0.0293
[1.27]
0.019
[0.97]
280
0.99

Table C-2: First Differences estimation results on decentralization effects on health
care access- Hypotheses 1 and 2
% of births attended in
health facilities
Dependent Variable
Model specification

=====>

Independent Varibles /1
Fiscal Decentralization (FD) rd
Political Decentralization (PD) le

(1)
0.30
[2.24]**
0.04
[1.84]*

Political Decentralization (PD) se
Administrative Decentralization (AD)

0.028
[1.75]*

(2)

(3)

0.36
0.56
[2.64]*** [3.22]***

0.016
[0.60]
0.044
[2.76]***

Developed Country (D)
(D*FD)

% of births
attended by skilled
personnel
(4)
0.478
[3.76]***

0.009
[0.36]
0.04
[2.51]**
0
[.]
-0.551

0.001
[0.05]
0.016
[0.74]
0
[.]
-0.516

[3.17]***

[3.86]***

Transition Country (T)
(T*FD)
GDP per capita /2
Voice and Accountability
Per capita health expenditure /2

Constant

0.0007
[0.40]
0.009
[0.59]
0.0091

0.0009
[0.35]
0.013
[0.80]
0.0099

0.0006
[0.57]
0.017
[1.03]
0.0087

0.0011
[1.85]*
0.035
[1.68]*
0.0010

[0.54]

[0.54]

[0.33]

[1.29]

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.001

[0.47]

[0.18]

[0.23]

[0.22]

Observations
147
150
150
R-squared
0.33
0.29
0.34
Panel robust t statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies are omitted in the table.
2/ Units transformed (in thousands)
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149
0.17

Table C-3: System GMM estimation results on decentralization effects on health
care access- Hypotheses 1 and 2

Dependent Variable
Model specification

=====>

Independent Varibles /1
Lag exec(i)

% of
births
attended
(1)

% of births attended by
skilled personnel
(2)

(3)

(4)

0.55

0.14

-0.049

0.13

[5.37]***

[1.21]
0.581

[0.48]
0.785

[1.40]

[1.85]*

[2.03]**

Fiscal Decentralization (FD rd)
Fiscal Decentralization (FD ed)

-0.006

0.264

Political Decentralization (PD) le

[0.05]
0.029
[0.69]

[1.46]
-0.002
[0.05]

-0.021
[0.42]

Political Decentralization (PD) se
Administrative Decentralization (AD)

-0.01
0.064

0.019

[2.41]**

[0.58]

0.0007
[0.78]
0.066
[1.15]
0.029

[1.72]*

0.0009
[0.83]
0.151
[2.34]**
0.021

[0.34]
0.137
[2.30]**
0.0270

[0.64]
0.124
[2.58]***
0.0230

[0.65]
0.024
[1.62]
-0.002
[0.13]
0.277

[2.19]**
-0.004
[0.25]
0.013
[0.79]
0.641

[2.36]**
-0.013
[0.82]
0.019
[0.98]
0.757

[1.77]*
-0.003
[0.25]
0.011
[0.74]
0.68

[4.30]***

[5.76]***

[7.41]***

[7.62]***

(D*FD)

Voice and Accountability
Per capita health expenditure /2
time==2
time==3
Constant

0.048

[0.14]
0
[.]
0.289
[1.88]*
0.0012

Developed Country (D)

GDP per capita /2

[0.17]
-0.004

Observations
211
224
229
Number of panels
92
98
100
Panel robust z statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies are omitted in the table.
2/ Units transformed (in thousands)
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0.0008

215
94

Table C-4: fixed effects estimation results on decentralization effects on access to
improved water source- Hypotheses 1 and 2
Dependent variable

======>

Model specification

% of people with
access to improved
water source

(1)

Independent Varibles /1
Fiscal Decentralization (FD rd)
Fiscal Decentralization (FD ed)
Political Decentralization (PD) le

(2)

% of people with
access to improved
water source in rural
areas

(3)

0.11

0.187

[1.58]

[1.73]*

(4)

0.011

0.02

[0.36]
0.051
[3.61]***

[0.27]

Political Decentralization (PD) se

0.032

0.01

0.013

Administrative Decentralization (AD)

0.014

[1.61]
0.031

[0.71]
0.014

[0.92]
0.019

[1.07]

[2.61]**

[1.25]
-0.174
[0.86]
0.72
[0.89]

[1.81]*
-0.165
[4.11]***

0.214
[24.52]***
0.0011

0.167
[7.60]***
0.0018

0.0022

0.0013

Voice and Accountability

[0.09]
-0.016
[0.81]

[0.44]
-0.006
[0.32]

[0.71]
0.013
[0.85]

[0.64]
0.016
[0.87]

Constant

0.681

0.726

0.895

0.929

Developed Country (D)
(D*FD)
Transition Country (T)
(T*FD)
GDP per capita /2

[30.85]*** [47.19]*** [31.70]*** [38.69]***

Observations
279
294
278
R-squared
0.98
0.98
0.96
Panel robust t statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies are omitted in the table.
2/ Units transformed (in thousands)
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269
0.96

Table C-5: First Differences estimation results on decentralization effects on access
to improved water source - Hypothesis 1 and 2
Dependent variable

======>

Model specification
Independent Varibles /1
Fiscal Decentralization (FD rd)

% of people with access to improved
water source

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

% of people
with access to
improved water
source in rural
areas
(5)

0.21

0.09

0.14

0.956

[2.56]**

[1.69]*

[2.36]**

[2.03]**

Fiscal Decentralization (FD ed)

0.00

Political Decentralization (PD) le

0.033
[3.15]***

[0.27]
0.036
[3.55]***

Political Decentralization (PD) se

0.015

0.017

-0.019

Administrative Decentralization (AD)

[1.00]
0.03

[1.13]
0.006

Developed Country (D)
(D*FD)

[3.59]***
0
[.]
-0.193
[2.30]**

0.02

0.02

[1.19]
0.03

[2.22]**

[2.20]**

[3.79]***

[0.69]

Transition Country (T)

0.0017

0.0012

0.0011

0.0007

0
[.]
-0.886
[1.97]*
0.0023

[2.16]**
-0.012

[0.55]
-0.016

[0.03]
-0.012

[0.57]
-0.013

[0.69]
0.002
[0.16]

(T*FD)
GDP per capita /2
Voice and Accountability

Constant

[0.71]

[0.95]

[0.72]

[0.78]

0

-0.001

-0.001

0

0.006

[0.11]

[0.18]

[0.41]

[0.13]

[0.81]

Observations
149
146
142
R-squared
0.22
0.25
0.26
Panel robust t statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies are omitted in the table.
2/ Units transformed (in thousands)
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149

139

0.20

0.27

Table C-6: System GMM estimation results on decentralization effects on access to
improved water source- Hypothesis 1 and 2
Dependent variable

======>

Model specification
Independent Varibles /1
Lag exec(i)
Fiscal Decentralization (FD rd)

% of people with access to improved water source

(1)

(2)

(5)

0.571

0.405

0.356

0.504

0.571

0.32

[3.29]***
-0.004

[1.89]*

[3.30]***

[3.90]***
-0.033

[1.22]
0.376

[0.53]

[0.05]

[0.29]

[2.37]**

-0.03

-0.02

[0.65]

[0.33]
0.062
[3.05]***

0.057
[2.23]**

Political Decentralization (PD) se
Administrative Decentralization (AD)

(4)

[3.89]***
-0.068

Fiscal Decentralization (FD ed)
Political Decentralization (PD) le

(3)

% of people with
access to improved
water source in rural
areas
(6)

0.06
[2.15]**

0.064

0.071

0.071

[3.00]***
0.023

[1.06]

0.025

[2.42]**
0.021

[0.80]

[1.13]

[1.43]

Developed Country (D)

0.019

0.03

[0.90]
0.069
[1.23]

[0.87]

(D*FDrd)

-0.059
[0.37]

(D*FDed)

-0.05
[0.57]

Transition Country (T)

0.0025

0.0031

0.0025

0.0031

-0.115
[0.89]
0.123
[0.25]
0.0021

[1.68]*
-0.004
[0.11]
0.013
[1.53]
0.002

[0.79]
0.024
[0.97]
0.008
[1.13]
0

[1.00]
0.022
[0.61]
0.009
[1.21]
-0.001

[0.96]
0.007
[0.23]
0.009
[1.04]
0.001

[0.66]
0.007
[0.19]
0.011
[1.18]
0.006

[0.80]
-0.034
[1.08]
0.011
[1.18]
0

[0.31]

[0.07]

[0.16]

[0.13]

[0.63]

[0.01]

(T*FD)
GDP per capita /2
Voice and Accountability
time==2
time==3

Constant

0.0017

0.314

0.456

0.498

0.366

0.326

0.417

[3.00]***

[4.69]***

[3.36]***

[3.16]***

[2.96]***

[2.50]**

212

219

208

93

96

94

Observations
219
224
217
Number of panels
96
98
95
Panel robust z statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies are omitted in the table.
2/ Units transformed (in thousands)
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Table C-7: fixed effects estimation results on decentralization (additional
interaction) effects on health care access- Hypothesis 3
Dependent variable

======>

Model specification
Independent Varibles /1
Fiscal Decentralization (FD rd)

% of birth attended in health facilities

(1)

(2)

0.25

0.42

[2.44]** [2.67]***

(3)

0.032
[1.68]*

Political Decentralization (PD) se
Administrative Decentralization (AD)

(5)

0.30

0.27

[1.79]*

[1.66]*

Fiscal Decentralization (FD ed)
Political Decentralization (PD) le

(4)

% of births
Immunization
attended by skilled coverage (%)
personnel
for DPT

(6)

(7)

0.014

-0.013

0.137

[0.25]

[0.35]

[2.30]**

0.066
[2.10]**
0.069

0.071

0.049

0.06

0.017

[2.04]**

[1.95]*

[1.53]

[2.13]**

[0.47]

-0.073

-0.1
[0.82]
0.0092
[1.93]*
-0.024
[1.02]

0.055
[1.66]*

(FDrd*PDle)

-0.084
[0.63]

(FDrd*AD)

-0.074
[0.66]

(FDrd*Pdse)

-0.108

-0.074

[0.93]

[0.48]

(FDed*PDse)
GDP per capita /2

-0.035
0.0020
[2.11]**

0.0029
[1.33]
-0.009
[0.65]

0.0025
[0.93]
-0.012
[0.78]

[0.28]
0.0039
[0.69]
-0.005
[0.32]

0.0021
[1.94]*
-0.013
[0.66]

[0.68]
0.0019
[1.23]
-0.005
[0.27]

0.832

0.768

0.791

0.845

0.875

0.931

Control of Corruption

Constant

[27.09]*** [14.72]*** [17.51]*** [23.26]***[19.97]***[31.94]***

Observations
R-squared

0.935
[30.81]***

383

294

283

283

292

281

287

0.98

0.99

0.99

0.99

0.99

0.98

0.93

Panel robust t statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies are omitted in the table.
2/ Units transformed (in thousands)
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Table C-8: First Differences estimation results on decentralization (additional
interaction) effects on health care access- Hypothesis 3
Dependent variable

======>

Model specification
Independent Varibles /1
Fiscal Decentralization (FD rd)
Political Decentralization (PD) le

% of birth attended in health
facilities

(1)

(2)

(3)

% of births attended by skilled
personnel

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.49

0.30

0.28

0.302

0.37

0.40

[2.63]**
0.109
[2.77]***

[2.28]**
0.031
[1.47]

[2.24]**
0.033
[0.92]

[2.52]**
0.038
[2.44]**

[2.01]**
0.081
[1.57]

[2.69]***

Political Decentralization (PD) se

0.058
[1.46]

Administrative Decentralization (AD)

(FDrd*PDle)

-0.015

0.059

0.031

[0.77]

[3.02]***

[0.62]

-0.25

-0.05

-0.199

[1.49]

[0.39]

[0.86]

(FDrd*Pdse)

-0.123
[0.65]

(FDrd*AD)

0.157
[0.70]

(AD*PDle)
GDP per capita /2

0.051
0.0025
[0.49]

Voice and Accountability
Control of Corruption

[2.08]**
0.0036
[0.26]
0.014
[1.01]

0.0024
[1.01]

0.0019
[0.65]
0.025
[1.30]

-0.015
[1.43]

Public health expenditure as %of GDP

0.0032
[0.95]

0.0028
[1.95]*

-0.018
[1.16]

-0.021
[1.37]

-0.175
[1.03]

Per capita health expenditure /2

0.0091
[0.17]

Constant

-0.002

-0.001

0.001

-0.001

0.002

0.003

[0.56]

[0.33]

[0.50]

[0.24]

[0.53]

[0.83]

146

141

146

0.19

0.2

0.12

Observations
142
149
243
R-squared
0.38
0.34
0.27
Panel robust t statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies are omitted in the table.
2/ Units transformed (in thousands)
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Table C-9: System GMM estimation results on decentralization effects (additional
interaction) on health care access- Hypothesis 3
Dependent variable

======>

Model specification
Independent Varibles /1
Lag exec(i)

% of birth
attended in
health
facilities
(1)

% of births
attended by skilled
personnel
(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.499

0.66

0.65

0.06

0.175

0.207

[5.16]***

[7.65]***
0.102

[6.64]***

[0.79]
0.547

[1.43]
0.653

[1.79]*
0.484

[2.25]**

[3.29]***

[2.23]**

0.093
[1.57]

-0.001
[0.03]

0.009
[0.20]

Fiscal Decentralization (FD rd)

[0.41]

Fiscal Decentralization (FD ed)

(Immunization coverage (%)
for DPT

-0.011

0.011

[0.12]

[0.16]

Political Decentralization (PD) le

0.059
[2.03]**

Political Decentralization (PD) se

0.038

0.121
[2.38]**

Administrative Decentralization (AD)

[0.78]
0.057

-0.028

0.013

0.117

-0.005

[2.35]**

[0.58]

[0.36]

[1.45]

[0.10]

(FDrd*PDle)

0.0416
[1.84]*

(FDrd*AD)

0.149

-0.419

[0.93]

[1.39]

(AD*PDle)
GDP per capita /2
Voice and Accountability

0.035
0.0011
[1.95]*
0.065
[1.50]

Control of Corruption

0.0016
[0.18]

[0.23]
0.0015
[0.33]

0.022
[0.38]

0.021
[1.02]

0.0082
[0.61]
0.027
[0.55]

Public health expenditure as %of GDP
Per capita health expenditure /2

0.009

0.0079
[0.24]

[0.56]
0.0090
[2.12]**

0.009
[0.12]
-0.825

0.057
[1.59]
1.09

[0.48]

[0.55]

0.0087

time==3

[0.80]
0.016
[1.41]
-0.01

0.01
[0.90]
0.001

[0.07]
0.003
[0.32]
-0.001

-0.007
[0.47]
0.016

-0.002
[0.14]
0.014

0.005
[0.40]
0.011

Constant

[1.13]
0.284

[0.19]
0.225

[0.14]
0.235

[1.65]*
0.691

[0.97]
0.61

[0.64]
0.579

[5.08]***

[3.55]***

[2.78]***

[8.53]***

[4.60]***

[4.10]***

225

218

218

98

98

98

time==2

Observations
216
215
217
Number of panels
94
96
97
Panel robust z statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies are omitted in the table.
2/ Units transformed (in thousands)
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Table C-10: fixed effects estimation results on decentralization (additional
interaction) effects on access to improved water source- Hypothesis 3
Dependent variable

======>

Model specification
Independent Varibles /1
Fiscal Decentralization (FD rd)

% of people with
access to improved
water source

(1)

% of people with access
to improved water
source in rural areas

(2)

(3)

0.044

0.13

0.354

[0.54]

[2.02]**

[1.29]

0.041
[2.46]**

0.042
[3.16]***

0.021
[2.06]**

0.016

0.039

-0.026

[1.21]

[1.82]*

[0.49]

Fiscal Decentralization (FD ed)
Political Decentralization (PD) le
Political Decentralization (PD) se
Administrative Decentralization (AD)

(FDrd*PDle)

0.004
[0.06]

(FDrd*AD)

-0.098

0.108

GDP per capita /2

[1.25]
0.0018
[0.61]

[0.54]
0.002
[0.67]
-0.004
[0.37]

0.887

0.833

Control of Corruption

Constant

0.0027
[2.10]**
-0.014
[1.27]
0.89

[44.37]*** [46.35]***

Observations
281
356
R-squared
0.98
0.98
Panel robust t statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies are omitted in the table.
2/ Units transformed (in thousands)
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[12.00]***
265
0.96

Table C-11: First Differences estimation results on decentralization (additional
interaction) effects on access to improved water source - Hypothesis 3
Dependent variable

======>

% of people with access to improved water
source

Model specification

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Independent Varibles /1
Fiscal Decentralization (FD rd)

0.19

0.072

0.095

0.109

[1.88]*

[1.30]
0.031
[3.08]***

[1.75]*
0.029
[2.63]**

[2.24]**
0.02
[1.93]*

-0.007

-0.004

-0.004

[1.19]

[0.67]

[0.88]

Political Decentralization (PD) le
Political Decentralization (PD) se

0.031
[1.35]

Administrative Decentralization (AD)

(FDrd*PDse)

0.006
[0.04]

(AD*PDle)
GDP per capita /2

0.0014
[2.30]**

Voice and Accountability
Control of Corruption

Constant

0.032

0.029

0.033

[3.39]***
0.0009
[1.90]*
-0.02
[1.30]

[2.76]***
0.0011
[0.58]
-0.014
[0.83]

[3.36]***
0.0007
[1.34]

-0.03
[2.46]**

-0.024
[2.17]**

-0.002

0

0

-0.001

[0.46]
147
0.14

[0.02]
146
0.32

[0.06]
146
0.26

[0.29]
140
0.28

Observations
R-squared
Panel robust t statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies are omitted in the table.
2/ Units transformed (in thousands)
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Table C-12: System GMM estimation results on decentralization (additional
interaction) effects on access to improved water source- Hypothesis 3
Dependent variable

======>

Model specification
Independent Varibles /1
Lag exec(i)
Fiscal Decentralization (FD rd)

% of people with access to improved water source

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

% of people with access
to improved water
source in urban areas
(6)

0.61

0.61

0.61

0.59

0.61

0.80

[5.40]***
0.159

[6.17]***
0.192

[4.63]***
0.121

[4.50]***
0.225

[5.03]***
0.251

[7.92]***

[2.22]**

[2.12]**

[1.41]

[1.53]

[1.91]*

Fiscal Decentralization (FD ed)

0.041
[1.48]

Political Decentralization (PD) le

0.05
[2.13]**

0.054
[2.59]***

0.05
[2.00]**

0.082
[1.91]*

0.093
[2.28]**

Political Decentralization (PD) se

-0.023
[1.44]

Administrative Decentralization (AD)

0.028

0.037

0.03

0.034

[1.19]

[0.93]

[1.19]

[1.74]*

[1.07]

-0.14

-0.179

[0.79]

[1.26]

(FDrd*PDle)
(FDrd*AD)

0.024

0.055
[0.40]

(FDed*PDse)

0.06
[1.73]*

(AD*PDle)

0.009

0.013

GDP per capita /2

[0.25]
0.0029

0.0023

[0.33]
0.0021

0.0020

0.0028

0.0009

[0.66]

[2.07]**

[0.37]

[0.37]

[0.74]

-0.002
[0.38]
-0.006

0.001
[0.20]
-0.005

0
[0.01]
-0.007

0.002
[0.34]
-0.003

-0.001
[0.10]
-0.005

[0.98]
-0.001
[0.12]
0.002
[0.68]
0.002

[0.90]
0.254
[2.56]**
285
97

[0.81]
0.248
[2.96]***
285
97

[0.97]
0.267
[2.36]**
285
97

[0.48]
0.264
[2.31]**
285
97

[0.68]
0.239
[2.24]**
285
97

[0.93]
0.206
[2.26]**
206
93

Control of Corruption
time==2
time==3
Constant

Observations
Number of panels
Panel robust z statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies are omitted in the table.
2/ Units transformed (in thousands)
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